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Abstract
This thesis addresses questions relating to perceptions of abilities and abnormalities found
in everyday life. Abilities in this paper range from a total lack of ability to function in
extreme disability to a level of ability expected by society to enhanced and radically
enhanced abilities and their place in the realm of abnormality. We begin by establishing the
differences between abilities and enhancements. Following this is a discussion regarding
the ethical concerns of human enhancement. After this we turn to a discussion of
abnormality and the social experience of abnormality. These discussions lead into
establishing a basis for how many abilities are considered abnormal. This is then followed
by a discussion that specifically addresses whether or not individuals who voluntarily
undergo non-therapeutic enhancement may be subject to oppressive measures.
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Ability and Abnormality
Differences in ability have led to a hierarchical perspective of how people function
in the world. Historically speaking, we discuss the plight of people with disabilities as being
discriminated against because they are disabled. Their discrimination and oppression is
based on the abnormal quality of their ability. Proponents of enhancement argue that
enhancements can help the lives of people with disabilities. I suggest that enhancement and
disability discussions overlook an important aspect, the status of being abnormal. While
disability advocates recognise that their discrimination and oppression is a result of their
abnormal ability, we do not recognise the abnormality of enhancement. Instead, we ask
whether or not to enhance, if enhancement is ethically right or wrong. We do not ask how
the lives of enhanced individuals may be seen. Assuming that enhancements are an
inevitable step in biotechnology, I am going to explore the aspects of abnormality as related
to those with disabilities and those with enhanced abilities. Radical human enhancement is
a specific type of enhancement that goes beyond enhancement that merely improves a
specific ability such as increasing eyesight to see beyond the ordinarily visible spectrum,
increase hearing capabilities, and potentially increase other functions such as physical
speed and strength. Radical human enhancement is a practice endorsed by transhumanist
philosophy. The practices include seeking ways to halt aging altogether and thus increase
lifespan indefinitely, uploading of consciousness where the conscious mind is removed
from the human body and uploaded to a machine, and enhancing memory and cognitive
abilities. Proponents of such enhancement seek to push humanity into what some might
say is the next step in evolution. The idea of human enhancement of any level carries with it
many ethical issues. Nick Bostrom lists levels of objection to transhumanist objectives, of
which I will focus on one, which is that “it would be too bad for society,” (2013, 30). Within
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this level of objection is a question concerning ability. That, is, are some abilities better
than others? Should we seek to “improve” or “enhance” abilities? What happens to the
people who choose not to do so? Radical human enhancement advocates seek to greatly
expand human ability into something beyond human. When we explore this extension, we
have a whole new set of questions to ask. Who are these people? Are they human? Do they
count as persons? Individuals with enhanced abilities, radical or otherwise, have abilities
that fall outside average human ability. A normal ability is what we expect ourselves to be
able to do without great difficulty. Most conversations regarding the abnormality of ability
fall into realm of the abnormality of disability. I seek to expand the definition of abnormal
ability to include those abilities that have been enhanced. Further, I shall demonstrate that
enhanced individuals have the potential to experience marginalisation and discrimination
as well, based on their abnormal status.
This project aims to demonstrate how regardless of disability or enhanced ability,
perceived abnormality of ability is subject to discrimination and normalisation to maintain
a social standard or status quo. The existing literature in the ethics of enhancement
concerns a broad view of society, by evaluating enhancement as either a utopian vision
where enhancements solve the problems of humanity or as a dystopian existential
destruction of humanity. The focus of much existing literature consists of arguments of why
we should or should not pursue enhancement technologies rather than how we might
implement them or what they might look like when they come to fruition. Enhancement
technologies have been in development and use for some time now, to varying degrees of
enhancement and acceptability. The interest here, then, is about the perception of
enhanced individuals through the lens of abnormality. Arguably, one might say that
enhancement is a normal step or development stemming from human progress. From that
2

perspective, denying enhancement would be unethical. On the other hand, one might argue
that pursuing enhancements is abnormal. While I will argue that enhanced individuals are
currently abnormal, and radical enhancement is a particular case of abnormality,
enhancement in itself may not be entirely abnormal, especially on the individual level.
Abnormal individuals already exist in society. Further, a wide variety of these abnormal
individuals experience discrimination and oppression. Granted, not all abnormal
individuals face such hardships. Particular factors, notably visibility, play a significant role
in determining how likely one might be accepted as normal. It would be the case then, if
enhancement causes a person to be abnormal in the right way, that enhanced individuals
may face a similar experience.
In order to do this, first we will look at accounts of abilities ranging from disabilities
to enhanced abilities. Our current understandings of abilities rest on a linear conception in
which one either has or does not have an ability, with levels of expertise or capability
within that ability. Next, I have categorically divided enhancements by their ethical
acceptance. Following the discussion of ability, I will highlight several overarching themes
in the current literature of the ethics of enhancements debates. The themes are centred
around autonomy, equality and accessibility, and oppressive tactics such as eugenics. We
leave enhancement and ability behind, briefly, to explore the concept of abnormality.
Michel Foucault provides a sufficient genealogical account of how abnormality began, from
a dangerous concept of the absolutely heinous criminal monster to the everyday monsters
and little abnormalities found all around us. Foucault’s history provides background to
describe the normalisation process. The normalisation process is one arm of a discussion
on discrimination and oppression. Another arm is the idea of visibility. Rosemarie GarlandThomson’s work on staring is enlightening here, as staring plays the initial action that
3

determines the initial normal/abnormal judgment. All of this folds into a further discussion
of how enhanced individuals could face similar issues that other abnormal persons already
face in our society. While I limit most of the discussion to this point to somewhat minor and
more acceptable enhancement, I conclude with a chapter regarding transhumanism as a
special case of enhancement. While we may disagree with transhumanism advocates, there
is a certain level of longer term inevitability with enhancement. Transhumanism is
considered a fringe or bizarre practice, but it is a radicalised philosophy related to
enhancement technology that has significant overlaps that may illuminate a rather
interesting point, especially regarding disability. But first, an outline of ability.
Chapter 1: Ability, Disability, and Enhancement
This chapter addresses relationships between disabilities and enhancements. I have
divided this chapter into four subsections: disability, what is meant by enhancement, types
of enhancements, and the demarcation of what is considered therapeutic and what is
considered an enhancement. I use the term everyday enhancement specifically to
emphasize how we readily accept certain types of enhancements as normal parts of our
everyday lives. Types of enhancements do not necessarily exist in a moral hierarchy.
However, we act as if some enhancements are more morally acceptable than others. In
order to understand how this hierarchy developed, we must first address the difference
between therapeutic measures and enhancements. This chapter serves to provide
necessary background and definitions for later in the paper, where I will address specific
ethical arguments related to the task at hand.
Ability and Disability
When we discuss someone’s ability, we often refer to a task-specific ability, such as
the ability to walk or the ability to hear. The ability to perform an action is the
4

undercurrent of a human behaviour. An ability, used over time, forms a pattern which we
called behaviour. Behaviours adapt and change. An ability is essentially our capacity to act.
These actions may be in thinking or in movement, invisible or visible. When we speak of an
individual’s ability to perform a task, we refer not only to their individual capacity to
perform that task, but also to the tools that are available. These tools are in the body, the
mind, and the environment. For this paper, we will be focusing on physical and mental
abilities such as thinking and walking.
Discussions of ability naturally bring about the idea of disability. Or, what it means
to have an ability that differs from what one might ordinarily expect. I’ll discuss the aspects
of normality in the next section, but we must clarify what is meant by disability. Two major
models of disability exist. One is the medical model. The other is the social model. The
medical model of disability suggests disability as a lack of ability to perform a certain task
such as walking. Medical models of disability emphasize disability as an impairment of
functioning. The Americans with Disabilities Act first defines disability as the following:
The term "disability" means… (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
The medical model describes disability as a series of impairments or inabilities to
function at a certain non-disabled level. This model of disability focuses on an individual
not being able to do a particular task by either having the complete inability to perform
such a task, like walking or speaking, or having difficulty in performing that task.
On the other hand, the social model of disability refers to disability as a failure of
society to receive a person of abnormal ability to function with at least some autonomy and
efficiency in the world. That is, a person who cannot hear is only disabled in so far as her
5

ability to communicate is not verbal - it is visual. A person who cannot see is disabled in an
environment that emphasizes the primacy of sight. Social models of disability emphasize
disability as a condition of the world, where physical structures and architecture are
designed for able-bodied people. Think of the addition of ramps and elevators, Braille and
closed captioning. People who advocate for disability rights focus on the social and
environmental design as the core feature of disability. If all books were made using only
Braille, a seeing person would have to read much differently. The person with sight would
be disabled in such a world until they adapted to that environment. The social mode
critiques the medical model in that where the medical model focuses on a deficit on
individual ability, the social model identifies a deficit in the developed physical and social
environment. Fortunately for social theorists of disability, the World Health Organisation
has recognised this critique to an extent in a comment describing disability in the following
statement:
Disabilities is an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations,
and participation restrictions. An impairment is a problem in body function or
structure; an activity limitation is a difficulty encountered by an individual in
executing a task or action; while a participation restriction is a problem experienced
by an individual in involvement in life situations. Disability is thus not just a health
problem. It is a complex phenomenon, reflecting the interaction between features of
a person’s body and features of the society in which he or she lives. Overcoming the
difficulties faced by people with disabilities requires interventions to remove
environmental and social barriers. People with disabilities have the same health
needs as non-disabled people – for immunization, cancer screening etc. They also
may experience a narrower margin of health, both because of poverty and social
6

exclusion, and also because they may be vulnerable to secondary conditions, such as
pressure sores or urinary tract infections. Evidence suggests that people with
disabilities face barriers in accessing the health and rehabilitation services they
need in many settings.
The WHO definition of disability touches a bit on the social aspect of disability by claiming
that disability “reflects the interaction between a person’s body and society.” However,
disability is defined, a few things are clear. Our environment does not suit each body that
exists in it, regardless of what tools we develop and use to make our environment more
accessible for the individual. Under the medical model of disability, we are expected to
adapt our bodies to our environments. Disability advocates claim that the demand to adapt
should be at least partially shouldered by society. Our abilities, wherever in the spectrum of
inability to an enhanced ability they may lie, determine how we change our environment to
meet our needs. Disability is not wholly determined by society or pathology. Rather, it is a
function of both, the individual and the environment, social and physical.
What is Enhancement?
First of all, we must address what is meant by enhancement. The definition is rather
elusive, but all the descriptions of enhancement that I have found have a theme. These
definitions frequently refer to increasing or improving an ability. Enhancement changes an
ability insofar as the ability is still the same ability, just faster, stronger, more efficient,
and/or long-lasting. As an example, Julian Savulescu defends what he calls the Welfarist
Definition of Enhancement, defined as “any change in the biology or psychology of a person
which increases the chances of leading a good life in circumstances C… we can define an
enhanced state as a capability" (2006, 324). Savulescu also notes other definitions of
enhancement, such as a narrow definition, in which enhancement is “any change in the
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biology or psychology of a person which increases species typical normal functioning above
some statistically defined level" (2006, 325). As another example, Michael Sandel describes
enhancement as a means “to lift themselves above the norm" (2007, 8). Sandel does not
describe exactly to what is meant by “norm” but safe to say the norm likely resembles some
level of being of typical or normal ability within a specific context. Yet another definition of
enhancement, referring specifically to human enhancement, is from Natasha Vita-More,
claiming “human enhancement means improving physical performance, increasing
cognitive abilities, and radically extending human lifespan" (2013, 25). Enhancements, in
essence, extend an already present ability. In some cases, however, an enhancement may
involve the addition of an entirely new ability.
Types of Enhancement
For the sake of this paper, I will discuss three broad categories of enhancement:
everyday enhancements, therapeutic enhancements, and radical enhancements. These are
based somewhat in relation to their overall acceptance in mainstream culture. All
enhancements overlap in some way, and the differences are largely dependent on the
intended outcome of the enhancement and the context in which it is used. Enhancements
come in a wide variety of forms. Some enhancements may be temporary, permanent, or
detachable. Some are mechanical additions to the body. Others come in the shape of a pill
or a syrup to ingest. Still others may be creams or lotions. Even further, some come in the
form of wheelchairs or crutches - physical tools that we use for a specific mode of
transporting ourselves. Some enhancements are visual, while others are internal. Still
others may never be known to other people unless explicitly disclosed. The form of the
enhancement may vary from organic to mechanical, or even be a combination. Each form of
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enhancement can be found in any of the following categories. The categories I propose are
my own, developed to highlight a social hierarchy of acceptability.
When referring to “everyday” enhancements, I mean the little enhancements that
are most common and generally socially accepted. These enhancements are to “improve”
the ordinary ability baseline. An important feature of these everyday enhancements is that
they are not necessarily dramatic or extraordinary in some way. Another important quality
is that they are unnecessary to function in the world. That is, they do not serve to correct a
deficit. These enhancements are not unlike things with which we are already familiar drinking coffee, consuming supplements like ginkgo biloba or 5-HTP to improve nominally
functional cognition and mood, taking other nootropics such as modafinil or
dextroamphetamine to increase alertness and cognitive capacity. These consist of the
already established means of enhancement that we do not necessarily think of as an
enhancement (drinking coffee). I call them everyday enhancements because oftentimes,
they are things that are so ordinary in our everyday lives that we do not consider them as
uniquely enhancing. Everyday enhancements are generally socially accepted, aligning with
cultural norms. Oftentimes, they can be the same measures or technologies as therapeutic
enhancements.
Therapeutic enhancement are enhancements designed to correct a disability by
restoring a specific loss or deficit of ability. This type of enhancement addresses deficit in
ability with the goal of amelioration. Examples of therapeutic enhancements are prosthetic
legs, wheelchairs for paralysed individuals, medications for any number of cognitive
impairments, and so forth. Any technology that serves to replace or correct an ability that
has been lost or never developed serves as a therapeutic enhancement. Overlaps exist
between therapeutic and everyday enhancement by their technological mechanisms. The
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difference is the baseline ability being changed. For example, we might wear glasses to
improve already normal vision. Another person may wear glasses to correct poor sight. The
therapeutic value of an enhancement is in the context of its application. Therapeutic
enhancement is generally referred to simply as a therapy, or a treatment that has
therapeutic value. These are generally accepted by society and encouraged so that a
disabled individual can regain independence. Together, therapeutic and everyday
enhancements differ from another set of enhancements in that they are generally more
readily available and frequently seen out in the world.
The third type of enhancement I wish to address are radical enhancements. These
are extreme measures taken to change human ability. Radical enhancement takes on a
different level of alteration from our everyday enhancements. But when we start
compounding enhancements, we reach things that no unenhanced person, regardless of
how gifted or extraordinary in ability, human can do. Radical enhancement takes this step.
Examples include, but certainly are not limited to the ability to breathe underwater without
external equipment, altering genetics with gene therapy, uploading the human mind to a
machine, using nanobots to maintain health, indefinite healthy life extension that
resembles immortality, and achieving superintelligence in a human being. These changes
are likely to be permanent or irreversible as they incorporate significant alterations to the
human body or reject the body altogether. A major question posed by those who study
radical enhancement is whether or not the radically enhanced individual is still human or
something else? Does personhood remain intact? The potential of radical enhancement is
that it may change the individual from being human to being posthuman, or transhuman.
Radical enhancements delve into areas of science fiction and wild imagination, but
scientists are already working on some of these and more.
10

Enhancement or Therapy?
A demarcation problem exists in enhancement discussion, between everyday
enhancements and therapeutic enhancements, as briefly mentioned above. Andy Miah
claims that, “one may attempt to draw the line between the alleviation of suffering
(therapy) and the pursuit of happiness (happiness)" (2013, 292). “Alleviation of suffering”
is typically how we would refer to therapeutic enhancements with their goal of
ameliorating disability, disease, or disorder. For example, an individual who wears glasses
because they have less than perfect eyesight ought to wear the sight-enhancing glasses or
receive the sight-enhancing surgery. However, a person who has normal vision may also
wear glasses or have surgery to see even better than they already can. This first case is
therapeutic, while the second is to increase happiness. Medications also enjoy this dual
usage. In particular, modafinil has gained popularity for its therapeutic qualities as
awakeness agent in narcoleptics as well as its benefits for enhancing the abilities of pilots
and soldiers. The subject ability here is the ability to stay awake. When we make a drug or a
new treatment, it often used for more than one purpose. The drug use may be purely an
enhancement to raise performance from baseline, such as a soldier who would benefit from
the additional wakefulness. But if someone performs significantly below an average
baseline, such as someone with chronic fatigue syndrome, this is a therapeutic
enhancement as it is corrective. The individual mode of normality is not necessarily the
same normal for a population. The demarcation problem between what is therapeutic and
what is enhancement is largely dependent on the intent of the individual using the
technology.
We see this illustrated with another medical practice as well. Botox was marketed as
a cosmetic enhancement before it was known to treat muscle spasms and migraines. As a
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cosmetic enhancement, the medication mostly fell under the category of morphological
freedom. It bridges over to enhancement as well, if done correctly, in that it enhances one’s
appearance. When the medication is used in such a way to enhance appearance, one also
enhances one’s social status. When used for muscle spasm and migraine, one is using it as a
therapeutic enhancement. It is a treatment to resolve a debilitating medical problem.
Muscle spasm and migraines can be disabling conditions. The enhancement therapy ended
up being useful for more than enhancement. Botox is now also a therapeutic enhancement,
enhancing the lives of those individuals who are disabled by migraines. Many medical
interventions serve multiple modalities of enhancement.
Another issue in enhancement practices is the role of preventative medicine.
Medical technologies related to prevention such as vaccination pose an interesting
question. While we are manipulating our immune systems to have an ability that we would
not ordinarily have by injecting ourselves with a dead virus, are we necessarily engaging in
the practice of enhancement? Miah states,
... medical science has approached healthcare by giving primacy to the principle of
prevention before cure. Yet a similar principle may require to be employed in order
to optimise and expand the resilience and capabilities of people; in short, to enhance
them. On this basis, the distinction between therapy and enhancement becomes
redundant, since preventing many illnesses will involve treating a patient before
they are diagnosed with an illness and before they are considered to be suffering in
a way that warrants medical intervention. (2013, 293)
In a way, we have blurred the lines between what is preventative care and what is
enhancement. Genetic manipulation that prevents certain fatal or severely disabling
illnesses is technically an enhancement and a preventative treatment. Some medical
12

technologies are being developed to bolster the immune system in other ways in order
to prevent disease. Is this an enhancement or a prevention? Altering the immune system
to prevent infections is an enhancement in that we are changing the human body to do
more than it ordinarily would do. Immune-enhancing practices are also preventative in
that they are performed as a way to treat before something happens. As an example,
Wendell Wallach claims that vaccines are both preventative measures and
enhancements. He states that “if vaccines were once an enhancement, they are now a
birthright” (Wallach, 2014, 167). The possibility that preventative medicine is
enhancement in disguise is not entirely incorrect. What would need addressing is
whether or not we should be preventing illness, by way of enhancing ourselves.

Chapter 2: Ethics of Enhancement Overview

This section will address the themes in ethics of enhancement debates. The
themes are wide reaching and tend to focus on the priority of individual autonomy,
concerns of equality, and the potential for eugenic practices that are viewed as
discriminatory towards people with disabilities. The argument from individual
autonomy includes a sub-argument addressing morphological freedom. It is important
to note that like most debates in bioethics, these discussions tend to be one-sided from a
Western perspective with little allusion to attitudes in other parts of the world. While
the purpose of this thesis is not to debate whether or not we should go forward with
therapeutic and non-therapeutic enhancements, it is nonetheless prudent to outline a
few arguments to provide context.
Robert Glover and Michael Sandel both discuss the use of genetic engineering to
facilitate the ability to choose of deafness. Deafness is often described in terms of a
13

medical disability, as a lack of ability to hear. Deaf culture requires deaf people to
continue. Only by having deaf children is this possible. Should parents be able to
determine in advance whether or not their children can hear? Some view the use of
genetic modification to determine a certain trait as enhancement. However, when
choosing to have a deaf child on purpose through this technology, it looks as if we are
engineering disability given that we are viewing deafness as a disability. In deaf-centric
environments, deafness is not necessarily considered a disability because deafness is the
status quo of that particular environment. Being able to hear in such an environment
may not be a total disability if the hearing individual learns sign language. However, the
hearing individual would be unusual or even abnormal in such a context. This initiates
another discussion of how the social environment ought to respond to the individual
who is considered disabled. This complex question addresses major components of
human enhancement: autonomy, morphological freedom, and social theory of disability
and normalisation. The specific case of bioengineering a deaf child highlights how the
use of biomedical technologies must be viewed in context.
A major theme in enhancement debates is individual autonomy. One claim is that
parents who genetically modify their children’s genes before birth somehow determine
their child’s future by depriving them of the right to choose for themselves the type of
person they will become. A common term thrown around in enhancement debates is
“designer babies.” These are children that have been “designed” by parents and doctors
who select specific genetic traits. Robert Nozick described this process as a “genetic
supermarket” wherein individuals could essentially “order” children that meet their
specific preferences for genetic traits. Sandel argues against this, claiming that, “it
wrongly implies that, absent a designing parent, children are free to choose their
14

physical characteristics for themselves…” (2007, 7-8). Children do not get a choice as to
the fact that they are born, with what bodies, capabilities, and genes they might have.
Sandel’s refutation is a pragmatic response to the argument from autonomy. All
children, regardless of how they are formed by nature or genetic manipulation, are
subject to being born. They are brought into the world without consent. Nozick’s genetic
supermarket is a more conscious way of controlling the traits of the children being born.
We think that we consciously make the decision to have children with certain people,
but there are many biological forces beyond our control that influence our decisions.
The genetic supermarket extends our conscious efforts to choose reproductive partners
we desire in order to have healthy viable children. The existence of autonomy of the
unborn child is debatable at best. However, parents and doctors, with their established
autonomy, have some authority over the bodies of unborn children and even born
children, but only up to a point. The point where parental authority over their children
ends varies from one practice to another. At some point, parents must forfeit their
authority over their children so their children can express their own agency in the
world. The autonomy of children develops over time regardless of genetic manipulation
unless autonomy is somehow engineered out of the person. That would beg the
question, though, of whether or not a non-autonomous person is a person. In the case of
bioengineering deaf children, the idea is that somehow deafness determines the type of
individual the child will be and limits their future autonomy. By forcing deafness on the
child, the parents have deprived the child from the ability to hear. While this is the case
with the ability, the child could have been born deaf with or without the genetic
intervention. Further, if the child wants to be able to hear, later in life he may choose to
undergo a procedure for a Cochlear implant or, if possible, reverse the process that
15

caused the deafness in the first place. While bioengineering shapes some aspects of a
child’s life, it does not necessarily take away their autonomy.
In addition to addressing individual autonomy, Sandel also discusses “designer
children” in the context of how the practice of genetic manipulation goes against certain
aspects of what it means to be human by stating,
... the fate of human goods embodied in important social practices - norms of
unconditional love and an openness to the unbidden, in the case of parenting; the
celebration of natural talents and gifts in athletic and artistic endeavours;
humility in the face of privilege, and a willingness to share the fruits of good
fortune through institutions of social solidarity. The other involves our
orientation to the world that we inhabit, and the kind of freedom to which we
aspire. (Sandel, 2007, 96)
Sandel’s arguments, he claims, are of a different type than the common themes of
autonomy and rights. Instead, he focuses on the idea that enhancement somehow
undermines what it means to be human. On the one hand, Sandel’s idea of being human
includes celebrating what we have and who we are, as social creatures. On the other hand,
enhancement changes how we view ourselves in the world - that we must adapt to the
world, rather than making the world adapt to us. He goes on to say that,
…changing our nature to fit the world, rather than the other way around, is actually
the deepest form of disempowerment. It distracts us from reflecting critically on the
world, and deadens the impulse to social and political improvement. Rather than
employ our new genetic powers, we should do what we can to create social and
political arrangements more hospitable to the gifts and limitations of imperfect
human beings. (Sandel, 2007, 97)
16

Sandel’s rejection of enhancement measures are based in embracing human nature rather
than trying to change it. While to an extent, I agree that by focusing on improvement and
enhancement, we may lose sight of other social goals, Sandel’s argument can stand a
critique. Enhancement is not necessarily about perfecting an imperfect individual.
Enhancement, from a broader perspective, is about increasing the pool of tools and abilities
so that all may benefit, regardless of their limitations. The practice is inherently imperfect
with imperfect results. Perfection itself is a subjective notion.
As a response to Sandel’s claim that enhancement detracts from humanity by taking
a perfectionist approach, we might look at enhancement another way. We can view
enhancement as a response to taking that critical reflection on the world. Proponents for
enhancement often argue that enhancement is not only for the sake of the individual, but
for the sake of society. Those who believe enhancements will assist in human flourishing in
the utopian view certainly take up this claim. From another point of view, Andy Miah states,
“anti-enhancement advocates may argue that such an undertaking is troubling precisely
because it implies no labour on the part of the individual - and as such is a quick fix that
undermines the importance of human will and struggle in the achievement of certain goals"
(2013, 296). Miah takes this approach to mean that not only do we use what we have when
we are born, but all of the technologies we develop as we grow and learn may also be
utilised within reasonable limits. Developing and using technology does not imply in any
way that we are forgoing reflecting on our place in the world.
Unfortunately, what it means to be human has no real tangible answer, especially
when we are discussing which of our abilities are ethically acceptable and which are not. I
would argue that enhancement is a powerful tool not only for the individual, but also, if
exercised with caution and deep consideration, a benefit for society in general. It simply is
17

not the case that we focus on political and social betterment by not focusing on
enhancement. Society and politics will always change, for better and for worse, and with or
without enhancement. Enhancement can impact social and political change, of course, as
enhancement affects any social organisation. Enhancement should not be viewed as a trade
off with reflection and betterment. Enhancement essentially extends abilities without
necessarily rejecting the abilities already present, within a person or within a society. An
enhancement builds upon abilities already present and extends the range of that ability.
Just because people want to develop enhancement technologies does not mean they are
seeking to undermine whatever sense it is to being human. The idea that enhancement
technologies ignore some human authenticity cannot be sustained if we have no clear idea
of what it is to be human. Part of human behaviour has always been development so that
we may have better means of surviving. As a result, humans have an incredible lineage of
technological development. Applying that technology to our bodies and our environments
is a part of our means to continue going on as humans. While human nature may not be
something that can be described in some essential qualitative terms, we may be right to
take on the intuition that we use whatever means we can to survive and thrive as a species.
Enhancements of all kinds are a part of human life. While we may not be able to say exactly
what it means to be human or what is in human nature, we do ascribe a moral status to
being human. To take away that moral status is to dehumanize a person.
Returning to the main aspects of the ethics of enhancement, we find the argument
for morphological freedom buried within the argument for autonomy. Morphological
freedom is the right to do as one pleases with one’s own body. This includes a wide variety
of practices ranging from how a person may cut their hair to getting plastic surgery or
taking medications to improve performance capacities. Anders Sandberg describes
18

morphological freedom as a negative right. He claims that “it is a right to be able to do
certain things, but it does not in itself imply others are morally obliged to support exercise
of it" (2013, 57). Sandberg makes the claim that arguments against enhancement must
denounce some level of morphological freedom, because it forces a compulsory restriction
on a broadened spectrum of ability to change one’s body. In a sense, morphological
freedom is an extension of a libertarian or social contractarian right to one’s body. As a
negative right, though, it must come with some aspect of a positive right, and that would be
a right to the tools and technology used to change one’s body as one sees fit. We actually
see this argument in transgender debates today, where we must contemplate whether or
not gender reassignment surgeries and hormonal therapies are a right. With positive
rights, however, comes a certain limitations of resources. Positive rights cannot be enacted
without appropriate resources. So, as to how far a positive right can actually be executed is
contingent on whether or not the resources are available and how critical the right is for
survival.
Transhumanists and enhancement supporters claim that enhancement technologies
could benefit those affected by disability by offering more functional tools and techniques
to improve quality of life. On this point, Miah states that, “... the justification for limiting
medical interventions to just the alleviation of suffering, becomes less meaningful, since
healthcare should aspire to promoting general improvements in wellbeing, in which
enhancements are a part" (2013, 292). The alleviation of suffering can take a wide stance
or a narrow stance. While a significant range of medicine takes the narrow stance of curing
illness that has already begun, other areas of medicine take on preventative roles.
Preventative medicine can initiate a slippery slope argument. Disability theorists argue that
variants of eugenics will result if enhancements that prevent certain conditions is
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embraced, continuing to further devalue the lives of people with disabilities. Eugenics is
defined by Merriam-Webster as “a science that tries to improve the human race by
controlling which people become parents.” Frederick Osborn describes eugenics in two
ways, positive and negative where positive eugenics focuses on increasing desirable traits
in the human population by encouraging people with desirable traits to reproduce and
negative eugenics is described as the prevention of people with undesirable traits from
reproducing. A newer variant of eugenics, called modern eugenics, employs the use of
genetic engineering to achieve similar goals but without denying the right to reproduce.
Modern eugenics comes from an idea of “positive eugenics” that relate back to the idea of
being able to choose genetic traits of children to prevent the development of disabling
conditions and diseases. In this way, genetic engineering can be linked to an idea of
“positive eugenics” in that no one is being denied the ability to have children and thus is not
considered to be necessarily discriminatory. Rather, people with genetic conditions would
be afforded the option to ensure that their children would not inherit such conditions (such
as Tay-Sachs or cerebral palsy). The idea is that since it is a choice, rather than a law or
enforcement, it is more allowable. However, modern eugenics still has the same problem
that disability theorists address: by giving the choice we are inherently allowing the
discriminatory practice to decide that some traits are bad while others are good.
Availability and access are frequently cited as a concern for enhancement debates.
This comes from the idea that certain technologies will be out of reach for those who
cannot afford them and will increase socioeconomic gaps. People who already experience
socioeconomically difficulty would face even more marginalisation. In essence, the worry is
that without appropriate access to such technologies, those who could not afford them
would be left behind. Julian Savulescu points out that this is a matter of justice, and not
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necessarily about an intrinsic quality of enhancement. The fairness of enhancement and
access to it is largely dependent on the type of justice practiced by a particular society. This
holds true as enhancement itself has no particular status of being just or unjust until it is
executed in a society. We do not halt the development of technology or stop public and
private education because the least of us can access it. Why would we do that with
enhancement? It is possible that there is social benefit for enhancement if it is developed
with respect to injustices unique to the society in which it is developed and dispersed. The
prioritisation should not rely on enhancing individuals on the basis that they want it.
Research and development in enhancement should be done in response to meeting needs
of particular societies or groups. Unfortunately, this does become part of the larger picture
of resource allocation and distribution that cannot be answered here except to say that
those who have so much to be able to invest in such advancement may in fact owe it to
others to use those technologies for their benefit, not the benefit of the ones who can afford
it. Much like wealthy Western nations develop technologies to help with food and water
supplies in world regions that are critically underserved, similar rulings are likely to apply
here. Stemming from concerns regarding resource allocation is that any technological
development suffers from the fact that the parts and pieces, the machinery or it all, often
comes from exploited labour forces. This is a fact that may never change. It does beg the
question, though, of whether or not we should accept such machinery for other uses. The
technology that is being developed for enhancement does not need to be outsourced. In
fact, enhancement proponents can take it upon themselves to change the bar by
purposefully fabricating resources through more just means. Granted, much of this lies in
business ethics and political justice which are immensely larger topics than can be
addressed here.
21

In opposition to enhancement being unethical, some scholars, such as Julian
Savulescu and John Harris, go as far as making the claim that we may actually be morally
obligated to enhance ourselves and our children. In April of 2015, the Chinese experienced
international backlash for genetically modifying human embryos to prevent the incidence
of thalassemia. Thalassemia is not a fatal condition and can be managed with vigilant
medical supervision. Gregory Stock describes several cultural differences in the acceptance
of eugenic practices and genetic manipulations, through how abortion is suggested to
expecting couples. Quoting a paper by Darryl Macer and colleagues, Stock notes that “up to
80% of Americans would use genetic interventions to prevent a child from inheriting a fatal
disease" (2013, 306). This is despite that in the United States we have multiple means to
support families with disabled individuals. On the other hand, those surveyed in the United
States do not support the abortion of unborn children with known genetic defects that are
survivable. Stock claims that, “the option for caring for a seriously disabled child or passing
that responsibility on to the state is a modern luxury that few possess" (2013, 306). He
cites a particular genetic anomaly where this is true, in which up to 92% of Chinese
counsellors would advise the abortion of a foetus with the most common form of dwarfism
whereas fewer than 10% of those surveyed in the United States, Australia, and most of
western Europe would consider the option (2013, 307). Another survey performed by Xin
Mao and Dorothy Wertz found that up to 89% of Chinese couples supported abortion of
foetuses with genetic abnormalities (1997). Stock also notes that genetic counsellors also
advise abortion in cases such as these in countries outside of China that include India,
Russia, Greece, Cuba, Turkey, and Hungary, more frequently than northern Europe and the
United States, at rates approaching 90% and 20% respectively. This suggests a cultural
divergence over which types of children are allowed to exist in the world. Available
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resources and social support structure greatly impacts these decisions. Engaging in
enhancement technologies of this sort stands to reinforce an idea that normal bodies are
desired bodies and abnormal bodies are to be rejected or altered to align with what is
considered normal. A child who is abnormal in a place such as the United States is allowed
to be born. The child is still abnormal or disabled, though. In other countries, that child is
not born at all. Disability resources in those countries are often incredibly scarce if they are
even resources available at all. Parents will often rather not have to face their only child
being born and having what could amount to a tortuous life due to an extreme lack of
support and resources. Views regarding disabilities in countries other than the United
States vary dramatically and are often handled with far less finesse. The moral norms are
different. Why bring a child into the world that is going to drain significant resources when
not enough is available to begin with? What is considered a “life worth living” or a “life
worth supporting” varies dramatically from culture to culture, often as a result of a number
of combined factors including resource availability and cultural beliefs about disability.
This invokes a sense of positive eugenics in that couples should only have “normal”
children. Normal in this case implies that the child will not create such a strain on their
surrounding social-familial unit that could potentially threaten the lives and wellbeing of
their families. In resource-lacking areas, difficult choices must be made where incredible
sacrifices that could mean life and death would be taken if severely disabled children are
born. Though they are not being explicitly prohibited from having children, the rule is
understood without being written.
If we return to the of potential of having a moral responsibility to enhance, it is
possible that cultures with restrictive reproductive laws like China’s One Child Policy,
might embrace enhancement technologies in less resource depleted areas. Gregory Stock
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suggests that couples “are bound to feel strongly to have the “best” child they can" (2013,
306). His comment is contextualised in gender politics, where boys are valued more highly
than girls. In this sense, genetic manipulation in order to have a boy is an enhancement for
the family. Enhancement of unborn children does not necessarily stop at choosing genders.
The effects may not be limited to normalising, though, if parents in certain countries
actually do want to have “the best children possible.” Parents may seek out ways to
enhance other aspects of their children in order to gain a competitive edge. The abilities
they choose to enhance may be desirable and valued, but enhancing them to significant
degrees is abnormal. This suggests another branch of positive eugenics, where eugenics
operates under the guise that you can have children, even if they are disabled, but they
must be altered in order to be considered normal and not disabled. Eugenics is an
expression of social hygiene in order control the sorts of bodies allowed in society in
various ways. While the enhancement technologies are not aimed at preventing certain
people from having children, they are aimed at creating more acceptable children. It could
be said that preventative enhancement technologies are a cousin to eugenics in this way.
The number of arguments about whether or not we should allow human
enhancement to any level is enormous. My concern is with a social aspect of enhancement,
and that is the perception of abnormality. My discussion of abnormality seems a bit
adjacent to the thematic ethical arguments of enhancement. However, the social status of
abnormality directly relates to the ethical arguments of how we might go about utilising
enhancement technologies.
Chapter 3: Averages, Norms, and the Medicalisation of Abnormality
The discussion of abnormality and normalisation is complex. This chapter will begin
with how abnormality differs from the idea of the statistical average, or “normal person”,
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from Mary Beth Mader. She explains how the numerical average person is fiction. To
describe someone as normal or abnormal is to make a comparative claim. Her works ties in
Michel Foucault’s theory of abnormality. In his lectures on abnormality, Foucault describes
how society developed a medicalised everyday abnormal person. Furthermore, he explains
how this abnormal individual is subjected to correction or normalisation. The theme of this
chapter is the relationship of the abnormal to the norm, and the normalisation process.
In the context of ability, abnormality does not concern only deficit or impairment.
Rather, abnormality refers to any quality that deviates from a perceived expectation from
previous experience. Abnormality is a shaped perception that is formed by experience of
differences over time. We are unaware of abnormality until we have an expectation of what
is normal or we are explicitly told that something is not normal. For example, as a child, I
did not know that my family was abnormal. I learned that it was abnormal when someone
outside of my family told me. This new knowledge was reinforced by pointing out the
normality of having two parents at home instead of one. Until then, I assumed that my
family was normal because it was my normal. Learning that my family was abnormal is a
comparative action when I compare my family to other families. What I knew to be normal
to me was what I had come to expect. I began with the expectation that other families have
one parent. When experiencing other families with two parents for the first time, I believed
that family to be abnormal. As I began to meet more families that have also have two
parents, I came to realise that my family is the comparatively abnormal family because
mine did not fall in line with the norm of having two parents. The idea of normal develops
over time from the individual perspective.
What is normal is often confused with what is average. To better understand what is
meant by normal and the associated power of normalisation, we must consider Mary Beth
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Mader’s analysis of social measure, as it “... helps to distinguish the norm from a law and
from a rule, custom, or tradition" (2007, 1). Here, Mader explains that the norm, or what is
considered normal, is not like a law or a rule. People intentionally develop laws and rules.
Rather, what is perceived as the norm is coincidental. The norm is derived from our own
qualities, as they happen to exist. Further, the norm, as it is perceived, is a comparison. It is
how we differentiate what is normal and what is abnormal. Mader states, “Foucault’s
insight is that it is intrinsic to this new notion of ‘law,’ that is, to the norm, that combine
prescription and description…” (2007, 8). She is claiming that the norm functions by telling
us what is and what should be at the same time, using the same measure. How we
understand the norm in a descriptive capacity is through experience and observation. How
we understand the norm in a prescriptive capacity is through the process of normalisation.
Anyone who deviates too far from an expected norm falls into the category of
abnormal. For example, when speaking of abnormality, we often refer to disability or
disorder. A mental disability is any cognitive deviance that negatively interferes with
cognitive function. In the context of disability, this is the medical model of disability. The
medical model of disability uses the definition of disability provided by the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA states that a disabled person is, “a person who has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a
person who has a history or record of such an impairment, or a person who is perceived by
others as having such an impairment" (1990, 8). A mental disorder, as defined by the
American Psychological Association and National Institute of Health is defined by a certain
set of behaviours that cause difficulty and impairment in everyday life. These behaviours
may be normal behaviours, but the context of the behaviours is abnormal. For instance, a
classic symptom of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is excessive hand washing.
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Washing one’s hands is normal, but repetitive and obsessive hand washing is not. This
particular case describes the subject of the abnormality not the action itself but the
frequency, duration, magnitude, or intensity of the action.
When we say “this person is normal”, we mean that this person functions within
accepted limits. These accepted limits fall within a certain number of deviations on a
normal distribution curve. The “average person” is a hypothetical concept. However, the
hypothetical “average person” is used to describe what is normal. Thus, it is also used to
determine what is abnormal. Mader claims that, “... in order to sense fully the novelty and
centrality of normalising techniques, attention must be paid to the specific nature of
statistical measurement" (2007, 1). What this means is that even though the exercise of
statistics may tell us what is average, and the average does not exist, it does inform us of
what we determine to be normal. This comparative exercise is also a diagnostic practice.
Various measurements of the body can be taken, such as heart rate, weight, growth rate,
oxygen saturation, among many others. These measurements are compared to a range of
values of which a subset of those values are deemed healthy and normal. When the
measurement falls in that subset, this is said to be “within accepted limits” or “within
normal limits”. Values that fall outside of that range are abnormal. Doctors use this
comparison to diagnose illness. The next step is to cure the illness. Treatment focuses on
returning the measured value to normal. This is medical correction. The trouble arises at
the demarcations between acute and chronic illness. This line is blurry, as doctors are
constantly trying to cure any state of disease that interferes with our ability to function
normally. Sickness itself is not abnormal. However, chronic illness, like Foucault’s condition
s that will be discussed later, is viewed as abnormal. This leads directly into Michel
Foucault’s theory of abnormality.
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His theory of abnormality is a genealogical account of how the concept of
abnormality developed from a social perspective. Mader states, “Foucault holds that “the
norm brings with it a principle of both qualification and correction,’” (2007, 6). Like
previously mentioned, when we make the claim that something is normal, we are not only
describing it but also making an intrinsic implication of what the norm should be. His
account of abnormality demonstrates how the idea of abnormality developed from the
realm of law and medicine. Now, abnormality is invoked in everyday life to describe those
who are not necessarily ill, but display qualities that are undesirable and in need of
correction.
Foucault’s theory of abnormality is an historical approach to how people in the
cultural West, especially throughout the Enlightenment to the Victorian age in France,
developed a concept of everyday abnormal. He describes how a monster in the medical and
legal system is the root for the idea that potentially dangerous and monstrous abnormality
all around us. This particular theory is helpful to my project because it shows how, over
time, we have labelled even the slightest of deviances in ability as abnormal. In social
contexts, we use medical terminology to organise people and their behaviours into a
standardised model in order to explain the perception of abnormalities. What is most
relevant to this particular project is how normalisation is applied to everyday behaviours
and characteristics abnormal. Foucault’s concept of abnormality begins with the “monster”
of the 1600s. This monster was a legalistic categorization of a psychotic criminal. In his
terms, “... the abnormal individual is essentially an everyday monster, a monster that has
become commonplace" (Foucault, 2003, 57). The abnormal individual develops from
criminal monstrosity. As the judicial system developed, experts were called as witnesses to
give testimony about the accused. More and more frequently, the criminal proceedings
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would be about whether or not the person accused was the sort of person who could and
would commit a monstrous act. At the same time, the science of psychopathology was
developing. Courts used psychiatrist's’ expert testimony to determine the guilt of an
individual. This is based on pathologising the character of the individual. If evidence came
down to a “he said, she said” argument, an expert would testify to whether or not the
accused or the accuser had some sort of character trait that would lead them to lie or be
prone to violence. Thus, Foucault claims, “as crime becomes pathologised, and the expert
and judge swap roles, this form of control, assessment, and effect of power linked to the
characterisation of an individual becomes increasingly active" (2003, 38). Penalties for
those found guilty based on psychopathology were no longer punishment, but correction
by hospitalisation. Foucault further states
with the hospitalisation order, the administration carried out by itself a de facto
synthesis of danger and madness that previously had to be demonstrated
theoretically by reference to monomania. The administration carries out this
synthesis not only in exceptional and monstrous subjects, it carries out for everyone
subject to compulsory hospitalisation. (2003, 142)
When the court orders hospitalisation for the criminal, the crime is no longer a crime, but
rather a symptom of illness. Here is where we experience a coupling of illness with
criminality, and thus, correction with abnormality. Much of these procedures are practiced
today with being able to plead insanity or mental defect in a court of law.
In the conceptual development of abnormality, Foucault traces how we implicate a
particular behaviour as the cause of illness or irregularity. In doing so, certain actions
deemed immoral are equated with abnormality, or causing further abnormality. We must
ask, how did this normalisation become a process in both the medical and social realms?
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Foucault explains how masturbation “becomes the cause, the universal causality of every
illness" (2003, 241). There is quite some irony in this, because masturbation is so universal
but historically it has been given the reputation for causing illness. Foucault describes the
development of masturbation as a medical issue and turned into a social issue. First,
parents were told to observe their children, to bind them to their bedding, to report to the
doctor, should they observe them engaging in masturbation. The act of masturbating was a
symptom, and observation, restraint, and informing authorities was the cure. Then, when
not in parental care, this fell to other caretakers. The individual sexual practice becomes
the object of surveillance in the social structure, not just the medicalised familial structure.
The problem falls to nurses, to nannies, to friends or extended family. It is no longer limited
to the child, the parents, and the doctor. This process was thought to be necessary to
prevent a condition of abnormality from forming. The masturbator is described as weak,
pale, and exhausted from indulgent exertion. When we imagine an ill person, we see in our
minds an individual who is weak, pale, and oftentimes, exhausted. Or as Foucault describes,
“all the signs are superimposed in the masturbator’s emaciated and ravaged body" (2003,
238). Not only that, “we also find the idea that the time it takes to produce its effects is
absolutely random: An illness of old age may well be due to childhood masturbation”
(Foucault, 2003, 241). Here we find how the moral judgment of a fairly normal activity is
made into the cause of any conceivable illness. The child becomes the cause of his own
condition. The concepts of syndromes and conditions lays the groundwork for the
justification of a therapeutic process of normalisation.
The following analysis describes this syndrome and condition framework and
demonstrates how ordinary behaviours have become medicalised. Once medicalised, a
behaviour can be subjected to normalisation. These behaviours are grouped together as
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syndromes and conditions. Anything can be a syndrome, if it falls out of line with whatever
the “norm” is determined to be. Foucault says “I want to emphasize that, as you can see,
there is nothing here that is the symptom of an illness: It is a syndrome, that is to say, a
partial and stable configuration referring to a general condition of abnormality" (2003,
311). The conceptual development of a particular syndrome can be any collection of lessthan-desirable behaviours that are consequentially pathologised, regardless of how
arbitrary the symptoms seem. Foucault gives the example of “antivivisection” syndrome,
where people’s desires to protect animal rights are medicalised into a syndrome. This is
done “when deviation and automatism increase… there is illness that must be precisely
defined in terms of this increasing deviation and automatism" (Foucault, 2003, 159). Any
set of abnormal behaviours can be grouped together to form a syndrome.
As to Foucault’s idea of conditions, these are said to be unconscious background
operations that give rise to any number of abnormal behaviours
What is a condition? As a privileged psychiatric object, a condition is not exactly an
illness with a starting point, causes, and processes; indeed, it is not an illness at all.
The condition is a sort of permanent causal background on the basis of which illness
may develop in a number of processes and episodes. In other words, the condition is
the abnormal basis upon which illnesses become possible. (Foucault, 2003, 311312)
The condition itself cannot be cured, but it can be managed or contained. In current
medical literature, a condition would be like the American Psychological Association’s
personality disorder axis. These disorders operate as abnormal backdrops to explain an
individual’s particular abnormal pattern of behaviour. Personality disorders may give rise
to any host of symptomatic psychological disorders. For example, obsessive-compulsive
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personality disorder is heavily associated with the development of anorexia nervosa.
According to Foucault, “a condition is not a more or less pronounced characteristic. The
condition is a real, radical discriminant. The individual who suffers from a condition, who
has a condition, is not a normal individual. However, the peculiarity of this condition that is
typical of so-called abnormal individuals is that it has an absolute, total etiological value"
(Foucault, 2003, 312). Once someone is described as “having a condition”, they can thus be
“fixed” or normalised. Further, he notes that, “consequently, this notion of condition has a
formidable capacity for integration: It refers to nonhealth, but it can also bring into its field
any conduct whatsoever as soon as it is physiologically, psychologically, sociologically,
morally, and even legally deviant" (Foucault, 2003, 312-313). With the fluidity and
flexibility of the classification systems used to identify various psychological disorders, any
behaviour may be called into question. Any set of behaviours can be formed into a
syndrome that is an expression of an underlying condition. Further, the cause of the
condition can be traced back to a previous behaviour, like Foucault’s description of
masturbation. This link back to a condition is how we determine an individual to be
abnormal.
Now we must consider how all of this relates to ability. The abnormal status of an
individual’s ability is how we justify subjecting disabled persons to normalisation. Foucault
says,
The difference between disability and monstrosity is revealed at the meeting point,
the point of friction, between a breach of the natural law table and a breach of the
law instituted by God or by society, at the point where these two breaches of law
come together. Disability may well be something that upsets the natural order, but
disability is not monstrosity because it has a place in civil or canon law. The disabled
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person may not conform to nature, but the law in some way provides for him.
Monstrosity, however, is the kind of natural irregularity that calls law into question
and disables it. Law must either question its own foundations, or its practice, or fall
silent, or abdicate, or appeal to another reference system, or again invent a
casuistry. (Foucault, 2003, 64)
Here, Foucault is separating disability from monstrosity. They differ in their legal
statuses. Being disabled is not a crime. The disabled individual is seen as “upsetting the
natural order,” much like monstrous individual, but not by enacting harm on other people.
However, monstrosity and disability both fall into the realm of abnormality. The difference
is their perceived offense: the monster breaks the laws of society as the disabled individual
supposedly breaks the laws of nature. One might make the argument that all who exist are
perfectly natural, and thus normal, in their existence. But in being disabled, from a societal
level, the disabled person is abnormal even if the disability is in itself a natural occurrence
or deviation. Naturalness need not be associated with normality, and unnaturalness with
abnormality. In being abnormal, the individual in question will be subject to the social
pressure of normalisation. Foucault does not make this claim directly, but his discussion on
masturbation addresses how the abnormal quality of the action is not inherent. Rather,
abnormality is determined by social norms.
Any person deemed abnormal by experiencing a disabling condition is likely to
experience “correction” or normalisation. We are told that if we are abnormal, we must
become normal. Normalisation is expressed as correction such as therapy, medication, or
surgery, as mocking or ridiculing, as marginalisation, and as structural discrimination and
oppression. Anyone who is deemed to not fit quite right into the structure of society, who
has a syndrome or condition, is declared to be in need of “fixing” or pushed towards the
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standard model of normal. Foucault’s theory of abnormality links nicely to the social model
of disability in that both abnormality and disability are largely determined by society, not
by an essential quality of the individual. While abnormality and disability are not the same
thing, they are often treated similarly in social context.
For the norm to be relevant, normalisation needs justification. Foucault describes
this justification as, “this continuum with its therapeutic and judicial poles, this
institutional mixture, is actually a response to danger" (2003, 34). We justify our
normalisation as a way to prevent danger from occurring. If, as Foucault says, “a condition
can produce absolutely anything, at any time, and in any order" (2003, 312), then
conditions provide a vague and ambiguous justification for some future undesirable
behaviour. We have seen the development of how we go from the criminal monster to the
individual with a condition. The individual with a condition is wholly unpredictable. As
Mader notes
the crucial component of this homogenisation is the social technology of the norm.
For it is the notion of a norm and its deviations, rather than a law and its infraction,
that permits the calibration, correction, gauging, and management that is central to
biopower. The notion of the norm is what permits power to assume a therapeutic
guise" (Mader, 2007, 7).
The norm is the desired outcome for normalisation. It is the measurement by which people
are compared to determine who needs correction and who does not. The “therapeutic
guise” of the norm shrouds oppressive measures of normalisation by saying that this is for
our own good. In this way, those who enforce the norm say to the abnormal, “here, we can
help you, be like us” rather than embrace variance in behaviour. Many of these abnormal
individuals are only abnormal in a subjective and arbitrary manner, such as those who
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have the anti-vivisection syndrome mentioned above. Granted, some abnormal individuals
do exhibit actual dangerous behavioural patterns. The normalisation process occurs in an
effort to shield ourselves from the dangers of the abnormal individual with a condition or a
syndrome. Normalisation does not recognise the difference between someone who might
be an actual threat to society and someone who just is not quite normal. So long as the
individual is determined to be abnormal, to have these unpredictable qualities, that is
enough for normalisation practices to be justified in these views. Actions associated with
normalisation, such as discrimination and marginalisation, serve to enforce the power and
dominance of the norm but are actually harmful to individuals in society.
We make efforts to not marginalise or discriminate, yet we still submit to pressures
of normalisation by rejecting those perceived as abnormal. By clinging to a specific
standard of how to be, we make any substantial deviation from that standard a precarious
place to be. The more we view disability and abnormality as dangerous, the more we
engage normalisation tactics. The more we engage in normalisation, the more dangerous it
is to be considered abnormal. As it becomes more dangerous to be abnormal, the more
people fear becoming abnormal and fear the abnormal. Normalisation feeds itself in a
vicious cycle. Abnormality is a subjective and relative qualifier, applied to anyone who
deviates from a socially determined norm. After all, because we judge abnormality to be
dangerous, we simultaneously create the idea that being abnormal is a dangerous thing to
be. This creates the cycle in which we call the abnormal dangerous, we subject the
abnormal to normalisation and oppression, and create the fear that if we are found to be
abnormal that we too will be harmed.
The normalisation process is pervasive in the social fabric of the world. Foucault
describes this process as the familial monitoring of the child masturbator as previously
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mentioned. This monitoring serves to gather evidence for potential harms and crimes.
Furthermore, he claims that
an obvious implication of this is that the connection between crime and madness
becomes a regular phenomenon for psychiatry rather than the extreme case. Little
crimes, of course, and little mental illnesses; tiny delinquencies and almost
imperceptible abnormalities of behaviour essentially constitute the organisational
and fundamental field of psychiatry" (Foucault, 2003, 163).
Through the individualised familial lens, more and more behaviours are interpreted as
potential for wrongdoing or sickness. Every action may be suspicious. In turn, we have
pulled away from just the dramatic deranged individual who is committing actual crimes.
Instead we have condemned even the slightest of unusual behaviours as evidence of
disorder, of abnormality, in need of being normalised.
Chapter 4: Abnormality in Society
Visibility is one of the first factors that render a person abnormal. This chapter
begins with a discussion on staring, as staring is an action associated with visibility. Staring
is often a first interaction between two individuals. Viewing abnormality through the act of
staring, we can see how abnormality is subject to normalisation and oppression. The
second section address specifically how those with abnormal abilities face oppression. A
third section engages a specific question regarding whether or not enhanced individuals
can ever be considered disabled. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the idea that
enhancements, despite seemingly beneficial, might be grounds for discrimination and
oppression.
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Staring and Normalisation
When we encounter abnormality in the social context, our immediate reaction
begins the process of how we decide, consciously or subconsciously, to interact with this
abnormal person. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s discussion on staring begins the
conversation of how we begin to interact with abnormal seeming individuals. Staring is a
common first interaction between two people. We do not immediately stare at ordinary
objects or people unless there is something unusual about them. Garland-Thomson
describes staring as a means to express dominance, assert control, and assign stigma
(2009, 40-46). Dominance, control, and stigma are all integral elements of normalisation
and, consequently, oppression. Garland-Thomson describes some cases of staring as a
power struggle. The starer starts staring as dominating the staree. The relationship may
change, but our first impressions of individuals are given a certain level of primacy for how
we are to continue to engage with this person. Looking through the act of staring, we focus
on the visible quality of abnormality. Visible abnormality oftentimes determines how one
may further interact with another person. When confronted with someone who appears
unusual or unexpected, we stare. Garland-Thomson claims “the surprise that motivates
staring produces… an expedition in search of information" (2009, 19). When we look at
people, we take in visual information and process it in order to figure out how to further
interact. Staring initiates the judgment process that leads to normalising courses of action if
we determine the individual to be abnormal.
Social interactions surrounding beauty can illustrate how staring leads to actions
associated with normalisation. In the context of attraction and beauty, Garland-Thomson
claims that, “expectation states theory suggests then that attractiveness is not so much a
collection of positive bodily attributes, but rather it is the successful presentation of a
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normative standard" (2009, 37). We are apt to stare at someone who is beautiful or
someone who is particularly unattractive. Practices of beautification, in which people wear
certain clothing and apply makeup or even get surgical procedures, are all means to
conform to a certain standard to be considered attractive or beautiful. Despite widespread
social efforts to embrace individuality and diversity, there are ever-present subconscious
forces that push individuals to conform to a normalised ideal of appearance. As GarlandThomson states, “at the root of our craving for novelty is an anxious drive to be rid of it so
that we can sink into a calmer world where nothing startles or demands our visual
attention, (2009, 19). Many people in a wide variety of cultures go as far as plastic surgery
to enhance beauty. As a result of this, these individuals create a specific, normalised
standard of beauty. According to the Asian Plastic Surgery Guide, South Korea has the
highest rate of plastic surgery procedures in the world. In a 2013 South Korean national
beauty pageant, criticism was garnered of participants of the contest for looking too much
alike. Plastic surgery itself is a beautification and normalisation procedure by which
surgeons are trained in the same or similar techniques that lead to results that are
strikingly similar from person to person. Though, this incidence was blamed on the
publication of Photoshopped images of the contestants. However, we may consider the act
of using Photoshop to publicise these participant’s images as resulting in the same effect that regardless of the technique used, we have an ideal standardised norm for beauty. Of
course, plastic surgery is practiced outside of South Korea. In the US, individuals go through
plastic surgery with a wider variety of results, possibly due to a more diverse population
base. Though perhaps performed more covertly, we also value sameness and being normal
despite outward slogans to embrace diversity.
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The intent of beautification is to increase the beauty of the individual. There are
limits to the benefits associated with this increase. Extraordinary beauty is a case of
abnormality. Beautification can only be allowed to go so far before we say, too much, too
beautiful, no longer acceptable, and begin to undermine the one who has too much beauty.
Garland-Thomson’s idea that “we are obliged to act, feel, look, and be normal - at almost
any cost" (2009, 31) highlights this limitation. The subconscious social current towards
normalisation is powerful enough that “people who deviate from the formal, functional, or
behavioural norms lose the advantages of being normal. In this way, the label abnormal
reduces people’s economic and social status and relegates them to the outer edges of the
human community" (Garland-Thomson, 2009, 31). We marginalise people when they fall
outside of the bounds of what we accept as appropriately beautiful or attractive. Typically,
this is thought of as the plight of the ugly. Daniel Hamermesh describes in his book Beauty
Pays: Why Attractive People Are More Successful how abnormal appearance, perceived
beauty or ugliness, has an effect on wage earning. Beautiful people make more money than
average looking people. People who are considered unattractive make less money than
average looking people. Less considered are the normalising effects from the other end of
the spectrum. In a review study, researchers find that attractiveness can undermine jobseeking efforts, especially in jobs associated with specific gender roles (Johnson, Podratz,
Dipboye, and Gibbens, 2010, 301). The plight of the overly beautiful or attractive is
overlooked because we value beauty in such a way that there is an assumption that being
beautiful is always good. Often assumed is that what is good could be made even better if
there were more of the good thing. Unfortunately, it is not always the case. What is
beneficial in some scenarios is not beneficial in all scenarios. Beauty can work against a
person in many situations. It is not the norm to be considered to be generally beautiful by
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various cultural standards. Excess beauty is also an abnormality. In terms of appearance,
being beautiful in and of itself is not exactly normal. Applying the term beautiful to an
individual differentiates that person from people of average or below average (ugly)
appearances. While we have expanded beauty to come in various shapes, forms, sizes,
saying that everyone is beautiful makes the norm change from a standardised model of of
beauty and attraction to one in which all people are beautiful. In doing so, we change the
meaning of beauty to no longer mean someone different, but that beauty itself becomes a
set of variances rather than standardisations. In the end, being too beautiful or too
unattractive results in being treated as someone who just is not quite normal enough.
Abnormality may be fetishized or perceived as exotic. While certain rules of beauty may
apply, even the fetishized or exotic must adhere to some normalised standard to be
considered attractive and to maintain a successful functional status in society. These
observations demonstrate how an abnormal appearance, regardless of its perceived benefit
or deficit, pushes people to experience themselves as socially abnormal as well as visually
abnormal. Being abnormal disrupts the patterns of social norms of acceptance leading to
rejection. “The sight of an unexpected body - that is to say, a body that does not conform to
our expectations for an ordinary body - is compelling because it disorders expectations"
(Garland-Thomson, 2009, 37). An abnormal appearance disrupts our expectations leading
us to uncertainty. Normality is predictable. Abnormality is unpredictable. While it may only
be a split second in our first reactions, it is still the fact that we do not treat abnormally
appearing individuals the same way we treat normal looking individuals. We do not
express curiosity in the appearance of the normal in the way that we do when someone
looks different.
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When evaluating reactions to abnormal appearance, we can see how this holds true
in the case of abnormal abilities. We do not easily accept or embrace those with abnormal
ability because it is too demanding or confusing for our attention. We have to take the time
to figure out how the ability is different. If the ability is lacking in a particular way, now we
must ourselves figure out how to accommodate for that deficit or work with the other
person to figure out how to meet goals using other means. To have a typical quality of
ability and be around someone who is disabled or naturally inclined to a particular task,
mentally or physically, changes interpersonal dynamic until familiarity is achieved. Simply
put, it is easier to work with someone you immediately recognise to be have an average or
normal range of ability.
A particular case of how we might react to seeing abnormality is the case of assistive
mobile devices. We can look at how we view readily visible machinery such as wheelchairs,
walkers, and canes for the cases of disability: “Seeing disability reminds us of what Bryan S.
Turner calls ‘ontological contingency,’ the truth of our body’s vulnerability to the
randomness of fate" (Garland-Thomson, 2009, 19). When we see disability, we might
express disgust due to the fear that this may soon happen to us. Though, perhaps we would
have less fear if we did not reject and oppress disabled people? When we see visible
assistive measures such as wheelchairs or prosthetic limbs, we think of how difficult it
must be to lose an ability we are accustomed to having, such as mobility. We do not think
about these things when we cannot see that another person is using alternative means to
assist in personal mobility. On the other end of the spectrum are using similar devices with
the intent of enhancing one’s already existing ability. Exoskeletons are being developed
now to replace wheelchairs for individuals coping with paralysis. However, these
exoskeletons are also being developed for non-therapeutic purposes. What happens when
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exoskeletons make walking a possibility for those who cannot ordinarily walk? Further,
how do we view an exoskeleton that is not meant as assistance, but as an enhancement for
someone who wants to move faster or more deftly beyond their baseline ability? Would
seeing exoskeletons in use more frequently make them seem more normal? Perhaps. So far
most of these things have only shown up in fiction and fantasy. But, we look to those who
can do more, who are enhanced, to do more. In our fictitious worlds, X-Men and Heroes
both demonstrate how we may react to individuals who have these abnormal but
supposedly beneficially enhanced abilities. The abnormally abled individuals are expected
to live in the fringes of society and save the world that rejects them at the same time. Our
imagined accounts warn us of how we can go wrong. They stand as lessons as to why we
should not marginalise people who are different. What will we do should such abilities
become reality? We already fetishize individuals with extreme natural abilities. Half of our
television programming is dedicated to gawking over the amazingness of someone who has
a particular superior ability. Off camera, however, these individuals live radically different
lives that do not fall into the socially expected and accepted norms, even though we
approve of their abnormal abilities. When we do this, we are approving the ability without
approving of the person with the ability. Biographical accounts of Olympians and concert
musicians demonstrate how the lives of people with extraordinary abilities are abnormal.
Because of their extraordinary ability and passion, such individuals do not fit into the
normalised social fabric of everyday life. This is not limited to people who have attained a
higher social status because of their ability. Consider a lifelong professional gymnast. In the
community of gymnasts, this person is normal. In the broader social world, this person
discloses their status as a gymnast. Curiosity and judgment of this person follow.
Assumptions are made, followed by personal questions, requests for demonstration, and
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otherwise potentially dehumanising social interaction. This is not limited to well-known
professionals in their fields. The ordinary musician is often treated as a music box rather
than a person who plays music. Because someone does something considered special, they
are frequently subject to objectification and commodification. Exchanges become less
about forming a relationship between people and more about about forming a relationship
between spectator and spectacle, or consumer and product. The moment of disclosing the
abnormality becomes a pivotal point in interaction. Some do not get a choice in disclosure,
if their abnormalities are worn on the outside. They are subjected to a dehumanising
process just by being in public. If viewed as too abnormal, an enhanced individual,
regardless of therapeutic value of the enhancement, is unlikely to be treated as a normal
person but rather as something else, something other, something abnormal. While these
examples are demonstrative of day-to-day examples of exploitation, we can look at how
such exploitation can become systematised when we look at how institutionalised
enhancement already is becoming in the professional athletic world. The fact that such
rigour is required to prevent enhancement technologies from being used in athletic
competition is evidence enough to show how enhancement itself becomes an exploitative
component. Athletes are faced with the choice of submitting to enhancement technologies
or lessening their odds of winning and maintaining their contracts. If they submit to
enhancement, they may be subjected to any number of exploitative measures to keep them
in line based solely on the fact that they have engaged in enhancement technologies.
The visibility component is largely how we see discrimination and oppression in
real-life tangible action. New visible technology is at a precarious state of whether or not it
will become a norm. Bluetooth headsets became a norm. We do not ordinarily equate such
a device as an enhancement, just as a tool that we use to extend an ability or activity.
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However, many enhancements are just that – tools that we use to extend certain abilities.
We do not immediately differentiate the role of an enhancement, whether it has a
therapeutic value or non-therapeutic value. Other visible technologies that augment our
abilities did not catch onto society, though, like Google Glass. If one immediately appears
too abnormal, it does not matter what role the abnormality plays. The abnormality
provokes curiosity and attention. What we see at first is a visible anomaly in the form of a
disabled person using an enhancement to achieve a normal expected range of function or a
typically able person using a non-therapeutic enhancement to increase the range of
function. As it stands, more people engage in therapeutic enhancements in the social visual
field than they engage in significant visible non-therapeutic enhancements. We see
wheelchairs more often than we see exoskeletons or Google Glass or some other external
enhancement. Those using therapeutic enhancements are often doing so to correct for a
disability and to increase their ability to function in less than accessible environments. In
effect, they are enacting normalisation. Despite their efforts, though, these disabled
individuals, with their abnormalities worn on the outside, are subjected to discrimination
and oppression, sometimes with immediate first encounters. Though, if a disabled person
can “pass” for an able person, they may face with more covert forms of discriminatory
actions. Rather than direct violence, a person who hides their disability or enhancement
may be judged untrustworthy. Those who try to normalise are discriminated against and
oppressed despite their efforts, even if the larger society deems their efforts acceptable or
normal for their situation or disability. It is expected that disabled individuals try to be as
normal as possible. In this way, a therapeutic enhancement may be more acceptable by
social norms than non-therapeutic enhancements as it reinforces a normal ability model.
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It is easier, simpler, and more efficient to engage those whose abilities we can safely
assume to be normal or, at the very least, similar to our own. Of course, visibility of
abnormality is not the only way by which we determine someone to be abnormal.
Oftentimes abnormality is not made apparent until engaging in further interaction.
Regardless of how abnormality is determined by the individual, there is hesitancy in
continued engagement with that person. This hesitancy, that leads to treating someone
differently, is what begins the initial first actions that lead to actions of discrimination and
oppression toward abnormal individuals.
Oppression and Abnormality
After an initial encounter, we set a course for how we interact with each other. Our
interactions range from rejection and acceptance, from oppression to cooperation. Marion
Iris Young states that “all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to
develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings”
(2014, 4). Oppressive actions violate individual liberty, personal rights, and limit the ability
to act autonomously. The combination effect of violating all of these creates the injustice
found in oppression. Recall Chapter Two, the arguments concerning whether or not we
should enhance. The arguments rarely involve justice in society until we turn towards
resource allocation and management of technology. When we look at how society
pressures the abnormal to normalize, we see the violation of personal liberties that effect
social levels of injustice. Here we can take justice to mean those actions by which we treat
all others with the utmost humane respect and dignity. We may invoke Martha Nussbaum’s
capabilities approach, which requires a tall order as to what is just. The capabilities
approach makes the claim that individuals must be afforded the resources necessary to
flourish. In failing to do so, injustice may occur. Where injustice occurs, oppressive
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measures thrive in the place of beneficial fulfillment. In the framework of abnormality, we
have an overwhelming pressure to be as normal as possible. The irony of normalization in
our current society is that we do not necessarily provide the means to normalize. One
might say that this is an injustice if we decide that normalizing the abnormal ought to be
the priority that we take. However, if we are seeking to disrupt the norm, providing the
means to normalize becomes itself an injustice if that is the intended purpose. In plainer
terms, providing therapeutic enhancement then becomes unjust. Of course this is an
exceptionally counterintuitive outcome. The example highlights how normalization cannot
function in a properly just society. However, if we are providing the means to upset the
norm, partially by way of technological enhancement, we must take it on the approach for
all enhancements in order for it to be considered just. This would contribute to a
destabilization of the norm and a weakening of the oppressive power of normalization if
done in an appropriate manner. While oppression serves to maintain aspects of dominance,
it also serves to enforce a status quo. One major function of oppression is to maintain the
specific norms of society. It has a dehumanising effect on those who are oppressed.
Oppression also reinforces power structures and maintains control over people and Others.
Oppression alienates those who are deemed unworthy of belonging. Oppression results in
great injustice for those who are unaccepted. A certain power is associated with
maintaining a normal appearance, and that is one of being able to live without being
oppressed. Oppression results from how society copes with abnormality. By forcing
individuals into a predictable model of normality, we tell these individuals to either
conform or be subject to oppression.
Being abnormal comes with significant challenge on the part of the individual. This
is especially true if the abnormality is readily visible. This unacceptability occurs regardless
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of whether the perceived abnormality is traditionally thought of as a deficit or a benefit. A
long history of oppression has already been established regarding disabled individuals.
Disabled individuals face all types of oppression as a direct result of their abilities being
perceived as explicitly abnormal. When disabled people are not afforded the means to fulfil
their needs, they experience oppression. They often lack access to resources or must rely
on others to help them meet their needs to survive. Society does not ordinarily see why the
burden for accessibility should be on the shoulders of the abled. After all, it is the so-called
normal people who are not disabled. But, as we do not live in the world without each other,
people with disabilities and differing needs have just as much of a right to be able to fulfil
their needs and live meaningful lives. Garland-Thomson focuses on the bodies of disabled
individuals to demonstrate the cultural nuances and norms of staring. We are in fact quite
often startled to encounter an individual who is missing a limb. The more dramatic the
visual disturbance, the more we are likely to stare in order to interpret what exactly it is we
are seeing. In staring, we must take the time to consider our next actions towards another
individual. The affective responses resulting from our initial interactions, curiosity and
disgust, lead into how we go from passing by a person to developing some sort of
relationship with that person. We make judgments in split seconds, to discern who is safe
and who is dangerous. The discriminatory practice is laden with repercussions for how
much we allow another person to play a role in our lives. Staring plays a role in oppression
as it signals the abnormality of someone else.
One of the main components of this paper is to question whether or not enhanced
individuals can face discrimination or oppression as a result of their enhanced ability. The
ability to conform to a norm is one that many people do not have. Therapeutic
enhancements are made to bring a disabled person up to a normal level of function. As
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such, therapeutic enhancement reinforces our traditional conceptions of ability. Nontherapeutic measures are taken to move away from that normal level of function. Nontherapeutically enhanced individuals are making a conscious decision to be abnormal. The
latter type of enhancement is often desired to increase the ability to compete more
effectively in our society. An enhancement of this sort extends the capability of an already
present ability. In doing so, an enhancement of this sort also reinforces the norm but
coming from the opposite direction as therapeutic enhancements. These enhancements are
often made in socially valued and accepted abilities, such as cognitive performance and
emotion regulation. While we may wish to personally benefit from our choice to engage in
non-therapeutically enhance ourselves, we are not doing so with the idea that we will be
rejected for improving ourselves. Non-therapeutic enhancements are made to extend
socially accepted normal abilities, to compete in an already unequal arena. When making
the choice to have an abnormal level of ability, we do not agree to being subject to
discriminatory or oppressive actions. We often view an enhancement as a beneficial change
in someone’s ability rather than something that can be a target for discrimination.
Oppression comes in a variety of forms, to a wide array of degrees. Young describes
five particular modalities of oppression: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness,
cultural domination, and violence. In order to properly describe how individuals with
various enhancements and their supporters might experience oppression overall, we must
take each oppressive measure in turn. We ought to note that Young claims that there is “a
consensus emerging that many different groups must be said to be oppressed in our
society, and that no single form of oppression can be assigned causal or moral primacy"
(Young, 2014, 6). This is to say that oppression may be experienced by any social group.
This is also to say that no form of oppression is more morally wrong than another, though
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Young does make the point that marginalisation has particularly devastating effects in
everyday life.
Oppression is and can be experienced by therapeutically and non-therapeutically
enhanced individuals. Exploitation may be most relevant to those seeking abnormal ability
status, such as those who practice non-therapeutic enhancement. Young describes
exploitation “through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labour of one
social group to benefit another” (2014, 14). Labour is a product of ability. Exploitation is an
unethical means of taking what one person does to benefit another person. Exploitation is
often achieved by lying, stealing, lack of transparency, and abuse in order to essentially
cheat someone out of what they have earned. This occurs without consent. An implicit
component of exploitation is the objectification of the individual being exploited. Enhanced
individuals may be subject to exploitation if they do not have the means to protect
themselves from predatory individuals. Enhanced individuals may be exploited particularly
based on the fact that a particular valued ability is the one they have enhanced. A nontherapeutically enhanced ability is exploitable in specific contexts, often taken outside of
the individual’s intention for enhancing that ability. One example would be enhancing the
ability to form memories. This enhancement could be performed for both therapeutic and
nontherapeutic purposes. In the therapeutic context, a neural implant could be used to
correct for dementia or amnesia. Alternatively, someone may wish to be able to remember
everything that they have ever experienced and be able to share those memories with
others. This enhancement can be exploited in such a way that others could gain control of it
and use it for malicious purposes without the consent of the individual with the
enhancement. Some individuals wish to enhance certain abilities so that they can use them
to better their own performances in their desired fields of career or recreational activities.
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Any ability that has a commodifiable value can be exploited. In particular, exploitation of
enhanced individuals for entertainment purposes can be established through
entertainment if we follow the lineage of circuses, side shows, and freak shows. Historically
speaking, naturally endowed individuals were involuntarily put on display as a result of
their abnormality. Individuals with exceptional strength or flexibility have been exploited
and put on display as spectacles so long as anyone is curious to see them. This form of
entertainment is still practiced today with extraordinary abilities sold as spectacle to an alltoo-eager-to-consume-the-oddity public. An individual who takes a medication or alter
their genetic makeup to enhance a certain ability may also face exploitation even if they
wanted that particular enhancement in order to perform as that type of entertainer.
Because they have that ability, they are potential targets of exploitation for entertainment
value even though they chose to undergo an enhancement for the purpose of performing as
an entertainer. Having a greater ability to perform creates a more desirable target for
entertainment exploitation. In enhancing their ability, they are not consenting to being
taken advantage of, lied to, or cheated out of just business practices. By enhancing a
particular ability, such as flexibility, the individual is not agreeing to shady business
practices. If their enhancement is illegal for participating in an event, such as doping in
cycling, and someone discovers it, that individual could be subjected to blackmail rather
than answering to authorities for repercussions. In the case of entertainment, increasing
flexibility through enhancement technology and not just training is not consent for being
subjected to exploitation. In the case of sport, exploitation is rampant without
enhancements. College athletes are exploited for their abilities in order to make profits.
They are not paid, though they may receive scholarships for their sport-related
endeavours. Scholarships come with requirements that must be upheld. They also come
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with certain unspoken expectations, in particular success. Athletes who enter into these
scholarship contracts do not always have the best guidance upon agreeing to them. If an
athlete is injured, they may be subjected to losing their funding. Performing arts
scholarships are also subject to potentially ill advisement and overly demanding additional
work. Their contracts often leave them in precarious situations. Why would this be
different for enhanced individuals who participate in entertainment or sport? Enhanced
athletics is currently condemned by sanctioned sporting organisations. This relegates
enhanced individuals to competing in unsanctioned events where there exists immense
potential for exploitation. However, the city of Zurich will be host to the world’s first
“cyborg Olympics,” dubbed the Cybathlon, where therapeutic enhancements are
encouraged. The event is currently limited to participation for those individuals who utilise
therapeutic enhancements. While currently enhancements of non-disabled individuals are
not allowed in sanctioned sporting events, sport has the potential to go the way of beauty
pageantry where contests are split up between “natural” and “enhanced” versions of the
same competition. While this may remedy the situation of mixing enhanced and
unenhanced individuals for particular events, it does not address issues associated with
sports - exploitation.
A second form of oppression faced by enhanced individuals is marginalisation.
Marginalisation can be experienced by both therapeutically and non-therapeutically
enhanced individuals. Supporters of radical enhancements may face some marginalisation,
but support for other enhancements is generally accepted. Young associates material
deprivation with marginalisation. Deprivation occurs with social outcasting and lack of
support (Young, 2014, 18). While we frequently disapprove of non-therapeutically
enhanced individuals by declaring their enhancements to be morally wrong or violations
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against nature, we do not deny them access to their regular needs. Non-therapeutically
enhanced individuals may not be allowed to participate in certain areas of life, such as
competitions, but this is not infringing on their ability to meet their needs to live a
reasonably fulfilling life. This disallowance extends to therapeutically enhanced individuals
as well. Therapeutically enhanced individuals are not necessarily marginalised for their
enhancements. They are most likely marginalised for their perceived disability, even
though they are trying to obtain normal function. Outside of competition, nontherapeutically enhanced individuals and supporters of such enhancements are subject to
moral disgust.
Violence is another modality of oppression enhanced individuals face, especially if
their enhancements are immediately visible or noticeable. For violence to count as a matter
of oppression, it must be systematic. Violence against disabled persons with therapeutic
enhancements is well documented in the literature and media. We do not have any solid
statistics regarding violence against non-therapeutically enhanced individuals. A specific
case of violence against an enhanced individual has been reported, by Steve Mann. He
reported in 2012 of being attacked at a McDonald’s in France on the basis of his wearable
technology. He developed what he calls EyeTap. The device fits over the eye and records
what you see. You “see through” the lens on the EyeTap in that it displays a computerised
version through the camera with the display fitted and calibrated over the organic eye. In
fact, it is somewhat similar to Google Glass in that it also can encode data and augment
what the wearer sees. Steve Mann does not use this technology to make up for a disability.
The device is worn to see things in the world that we ordinarily would not see and also to
be able to recall more of what we have seen than we ordinarily would be able to remember
without assistance. Use of devices such as EyeTap and Google Glass are subject to
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considerable controversy as their use records other people without their permission. This
broaches sensitive questions in surveillance performed by private individuals. One element
of this attack is the violation of privacy or the expectation to not be recorded by private
individuals whilst attending to everyday affairs out in the world. But this is secondary to
the fact that the device was so visible. Had the device not been visible, thus available to
provoke curiosity and questioning, the other people in the restaurant would not have
known that they were being recorded by a machine that was not owned or operated by the
business or the government. Had Mann been wearing a contact lens that had the same
capabilities as his EyeTap device, he likely would not have been attacked unless he
somehow made known to others that he was observing them through enhanced means. If
one is enhanced, yet the enhancement is covert or the individual visibly passes for normal,
it is more likely that person will be judged as normal and acceptable.
Another kind of violence can occur in enhancement cases. Certain enhancements are
mechanical or have wireless capabilities. As such, they are subject to all the harms relevant
to any other electronic device. Hacking wireless enabled electronics that are integrated into
bodies is a serious threat that can be managed to a degree. Other issues regarding
mechanical specifics would apply, though, including tampering with electronics, batteries,
parts, electromagnetic pulses, x-rays, and so forth. Special precautions are taken by those
who have such devices, but they are not without threat of technological violence.
Cultural dominance is the overarching principle of the oppressive modalities. Our
current culture condemns certain forms of enhancement technologies, while embracing
others. Recall the previously mentioned studies regarding using genetic enhancement to
prevent disability anomalies. Up to 80% of Americans approved of using genetic
manipulation to prevent a deadly genetic abnormality. But what about a survivable genetic
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abnormality that results in disability? It seems that the American population is split
according to a Pew Research poll conducted in August, 2014. As for non-health related
genetic manipulation, the same poll found that up to 83% of Americans considered using
genetic manipulation to increase intelligence was “taking medical enhancements too far.”
Surveys performed Hart Research Associates in May 2015 showed that opinions regarding
editing human DNA were mixed at best. These results are similar to polls from another
survey, conducted in 2014, by performed by YouGov that reflected up to 72% of Americans
either strongly or somewhat disapproving of genetically modifications for increasing
intelligence or other “special traits” and 72% worried that scientists are “playing God” with
such technologies. Enhancement technologies fascinate us from a fictional perspective, as
demonstrated by the overwhelming science fiction and fantasy genres. However, we do not
embrace the use of many of the enhancements illustrated in our imagined worlds. We
support therapeutic enhancements that bring disabled individuals in line with the “normal”
part of society (normalisation), but reject more dramatic, non-therapeutic enhancements
(abnormalisation). This creates a gap in what we view as acceptable and unacceptable.
Making oneself purposefully abnormal is frowned upon. The blurriness between
therapeutic enhancement, preventative medicine, and non-therapeutic enhancement
remains, mostly demarcated by a sense of some enhancements go too far in changing the
human body. Early opinions on vaccines and some contemporary opinions on vaccines
challenge the use of preventative measures, frequently citing safety concerns and less
frequently “playing God” concerns. While we may embrace some preventative measures, in
the case of preventing deadly genetic conditions, we do not embrace preventing all
illnesses. As just noted, the US is split on the prevention of non-lethal congenital
abnormalities. We may take many steps in our lives to prevent illnesses that we
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encountered on a daily basis, such as flu, food poisoning, allergies, and the like, but only a
small percentage of the population takes extreme steps to attempt to prevent every illness.
Some argue that preventing illness is unnatural, and will even go out of their way to induce
certain illnesses under the idea that contracting a particular illness will fortify the immune
system. While the human body is capable of fighting off many illnesses without medical
intervention, many diseases come with potential long-term effects. So, we must ask what
the prevention priority really is. For one, we try to prevent the diseases that threaten
human existence the most. Then we try to prevent severely disabling diseases. The tricky
part is where the line is drawn in preventing disabling conditions. As resources develop
and norms shift, fewer disabling conditions may be on the slate for prevention. Down’s
syndrome was once grounds for abortion. Now, legislation is being passed to prevent the
abortion of children with Down’s syndrome. While our overarching culture is neither for
nor against prevention, it seems opposed to enhancement. The opposition to enhancement
follows a similar pattern in how we might accept it. The more radical the enhancement, the
more likely it is to be opposed. A more radical enhancement in this case could possibly be
the ability to fly using wings or some external physiological addition to the body. The more
convenient, relevant, and covert the enhancement, the more likely it might be accepted.
Such an enhancement could be fairly dramatic for the individual, perhaps maybe the ability
to be immune to all illnesses. As a whole, the practice of enhancement in general is not
subject to cultural dominance though some extreme forms of enhancement might be.
Non-therapeutic enhancement that extends an already present or valued ability
threatens the norm of an average ability. In that way, enhancement is a clear threat to
disabled individuals as they are continuously subjected to normalisation. However, other
enhancements that add different abilities increase the pool of abilities. This effectively
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dilutes the strength of a norm. The use of cognitive enhancing medication by students is
rising. Universities have difficulty with admissions due to heavy competition of more and
more students who have perfect or near perfect scores. While universities have always had
admission criteria, the criteria have been raised over the years as more and more students
are performing at top levels. Use of cognitive enhancements turns this into an even tighter
competition. Overall, it leaves out lower performing students altogether. In a society where
a degree is practically necessary to survive, this means we can do a few things. We can limit
the use of cognitive enhancements to those who perform poorly. This would be subjecting
those students to normalisation, however, and violating their personal freedoms. We could
ban the use of cognitive enhancements from academic settings and subject students to drug
testing as we do athletes. Such a ban would be tricky to enforce and likely face backlash and
accusations of privacy rights violations. Given that education up through a certain age is
required, such drug testing would be implicitly required and incite additional surveillance.
Another route we could take is to shift cultural values so that the value of a student is not
determined by the prestige of university admission. This route would take away the
incentive for enhancement for competitive means, but leave developing enhancement for
the sake of enhancement. Trying to do something like this is essentially impossible, though
we could make small moves over time to discourage the use of unnecessary enhancements.
Yet another possibility is to separate those enhanced students from those who are not
enhanced. We already separate those who cannot participate in a classroom of typically
able students. We also separate out those students who outperform others with gifted and
honours classes. This is based on the idea that such a separation assists in the ability to
address the variety of needs of different students. In a class of 20, with one teacher, and
each student having a radically different set of abilities ranging from enhancements to
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severe disability, the quality of education possible is virtually non-existent. If four teachers
are present, the class may be split up into groups of sizes that have students of the most
similar types and levels of ability. And here we have separation to meet specific needs. We
already take this approach to education in most cases, even with enhancement being
brought into the picture. If enhancement is brought into the classroom, the only thing that
would really need to change is the addition of a new classroom and a new teacher to meet
the additional needs of a new group of students. There was no norm in the original class
except for a norm of impossibility. Now, there are four separate classes with four separate
norms. They could be compared – maybe. But maybe they should not be compared. While
we all have similar capabilities, our overall ability to do a wide variety of activities varies
from person to person. Those enhanced students have different needs than those who are
not enhanced. The problem is that after education, the enhanced individuals might be
found to be more desirable for “better” jobs. And herein lies the biggest problem. How we
value vocation and wealth ultimately determines the means by which norms will be shifted.
So long as a society continues a fierce competition for vast amounts of wealth or being first
or the best, the norms will never favour anyone who does does not participate. So, ideally,
this route, along with the impossible one preceding it, would likely be the best ways to
address the norm shifting issues that non-therapeutic enhancements bring to the table.
This analysis demonstrates how enhanced individuals can face oppression due to
their enhanced abilities, particularly if the enhanced ability utilises a noticeable bodily
addition. As a result, we can say that people face a variety of forms of oppression due to
abnormal ability, regardless of whether or not that ability is thought to be a deficit or a
benefit. Total oppression, however, may be reserved for those with disabilities and not
necessarily those with enhanced abilities.
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Disability and Enhanced Abilities
An interesting question that comes from discussing enhancements and disabilities is
whether or not enhanced individuals may become disabled. Enhanced individuals who are
not utilising enhancement technologies to correct a disability certainly remain disabled in
some way. First of all, abilities are not necessarily dependent on each other despite
interacting and influencing each other. Second, enhancement is not necessarily a global
quality. Neither is disability. Global in this sense is that the entire person is not enhanced or
disabled. We tend to designate people as “disabled” or “enhanced” if their abilities differ in
only one particular capacity. Abilities must be viewed both separately and together. As an
example, just because a person has an enhanced memory, does not mean that person is also
able to walk. The enhanced memory, regardless of whether it is brought about by taking a
medication or a neural implant, does not change the fact that the individual may or may not
have legs and simultaneously not have therapeutic measures to aid in mobility. This means
that the individual is both, enhanced and disabled at the same time.
More to the point is whether or not the enhanced ability itself can be disabling. In
the sense that any range of abilities is subject to deficit or a lack of environmental
affordances in which to express that ability, an enhanced ability can certainly be disabled
from its usual mode of operating. An enhanced ability can be returned to a baseline state
and lose its enhanced quality. This may not make the individual globally disabled in a
medical or social sense. Alternatively, the ability may be lost altogether. If a neural implant
that enhances memory stops working, it is effectively disabled. Further, if it stops working
and the individual loses all memory, the ability to remember is gone entirely and disability
of memory occurs. Alternatively, an enhanced ability can take on a quality of disability in
that it could be rendered useless, thus being viewed through the social perspective
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disability. If the environment does not afford the use of an ability, the ability is rendered
useless. If that person has come to depend on having that particular ability, it then becomes
a disability.
Chapter 5: Transhumanism
After a lengthy discussion of disabilities and abnormality, let us return to the idea of
radical human enhancement. Radical human enhancement changes certain features of what
we often associate with what it means to be human. Nick Bostrom uses the term
posthuman, whereas others such as Max More and Natasha Vita-More use the term
transhuman. The term is essentially interchangeable in the present context.
Transhumanism is a distinct form of enhancement, but it is a special case in that
transhumanists are seeking to alter their human form in order to become something that is
not human but retains some human-like attributes. This translates into a being that is no
longer human per se, but transhuman. The focus then will be that transhumanists will
likely face forms of oppression rather than acceptance because they are so different from
the human species norm. The transhuman extends the concept of personhood to include a
potentially radically untraditional human form.
In the practice of radical enhancement, transhumanists move beyond our concepts
of acceptable everyday enhancement. Even by enhancement norms, transhumanists are on
the farthest edge of the spectrum in their desires and development. They also may face a
unique set of problems related to concepts found in the social theory of disability as well.
Radical human enhancement will not necessarily face the same fate as disability, but the
discussions from disability theory can inform some of what life might be like if such
extreme enhancement is enacted.
According to the Transhumanist FAQ, transhumanism is defined as:
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The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability
of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially
by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to
greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.
Some proponents of transhumanism view the philosophy as seeking the next step in
evolution for humankind. In the context of ability, transhumanism aims to enhance human
ability beyond what our species can already do, to a point that we might question whether
the resulting person is human or something else. This enhancement is thought to
potentially break the species-typical boundary of human ability resulting in someone who
is transhuman. That is, while this person may share with humans the same DNA or physical
form, they are distinctly something different from a human who has not undergone such
procedures. However, this radically enhanced person may retain specific qualities of
personhood correlated to being human. Max More separates transhumanism from
humanism stating that “humanism tends to rely exclusively on educational and cultural
refinement to improve human nature whereas transhumanists want to apply technology to
overcome limits imposed by our biological and genetic heritage" (2013, 4). I disagree with
this statement, as we engage in cultural activities for a multitude of reasons, not merely
improvement. We also use technology in ways to overcome our limits all the time. For
instance, we developed cars and airplanes to travel distances much more quickly than
thought possible. Humanists also engage in using technology to improve our lives. The line
of demarcation is that humanists do not necessarily seek to transcend human biology.
A result of transhumanist ideals are radical human enhancements. I’ve mentioned
several in previous chapters but would like to focus again on the most thematic in the
literature. These include the eradication of aging (immortality), the integration of
60

mechanical enhancements into the human body (cyborgs), and uploading of consciousness
to machine technology (uploading). At face value, none of these enhancements necessarily
meet a criterion for being visually abnormal if they are performed in such a way that the
person still looks like a species-typical human. The abnormality would lie in the unseen
ability. In fact, many of the current technological developments are subtler or covert. The
technology often proposed for enhancing certain abilities are nanobots or neural implants.
Essentially, devices that are integrated into the human body. Developing technology in this
way is not only for the sake of convenience or efficiency for the ability, but also because
developers do understand that looking too strange can result in any number of undesired
social responses.
Someone who is enhanced in such a way would be practically undetectable unless
by using scanning technology, the individual tells you, or, the machinery enhances the
individual’s behaviour in some readily noticeable way. Say, for instance, a neural implant
allows you to remember everything you’ve ever experienced in your entire life. This is an
ability that is currently beyond the range of humans. It works by recording every single
perception and allowing for specific recall of any given moment in which you have existed.
The British television show Black Mirror, in the episode entitled “The Entire History of
You,” uses this sort of technology as a major feature in the plot. In it, the device is referred
to as a ‘grain’. You can call up memories and display them on the wall for others to see. You
can fast forward, rewind, zoom, and change volume. This enhancement is far beyond what
an ordinary human can do. And it is entirely abnormal. But, unless someone knows that we
have this implant, we can still blend in with everyone else and avoid discrimination from
species-typical humans. The technology could be used against you. In this same imagined
universe of Black Mirror, another episode entitled “White Christmas” imagines how police
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and judicial systems would be able to prevent an individual from lying, even to himself. The
enhanced memory ability can be exploited so that an individual is never able to forget.
Anti-aging medications are being developed in order to increase both lifespan and
healthspan. Someone who engages in taking such a medication could easily be exploited for
purposes of research in other capacities. For instance, it is not unreasonable that such a
person could be taken against their will and experimented on for the gain of other
countries who may not have developed such a technology. Stealing technology that comes
in non-human form is far from unheard of. It is not far-fetched to think that some countries
would do the same to technologically enhanced humans. Anyone with a radical
enhancement can have various rights violated or their own enhanced ability used against
them, just like anyone else. Particular enhancements do not necessarily come with a way to
protect yourself from people who would take advantage of it.
We already do not accept the ideas of transhumanists. Transhumanists make up a
small percentage of enhancement supporters. Oftentimes, they are regarded as too radical
for mainstream cultural norms. In this case, we can see the experience of marginalisation
where radical futurists are shunned or mocked for their ideas and practices, especially
within related fields. Marginalisation could be experienced more acutely by transhumanists
than by more ordinary enhanced individuals if, once they have become transhuman, they
have broken the species-typical aspect of being a human. We associate personhood with
being human. If someone who has been consciously uploaded, or has indefinite life and
health span, or has a body that is part cybernetic and part organic, they may no longer be
considered human. In fact, their proposed nomenclature already separates transhumans
and posthumans from humans. They may also not receive the same legal status as a human
based on the fact they are distinctly no longer only human. Narratives have been
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considered about the personhood of differently conscious sentient beings, mostly
concerning highly functional animal species such as apes and chimpanzees. This
unfortunately ventures into a long discussion of personhood that is beyond the scope of
this paper.
The other point I wish to address was whether or not radically enhanced individuals
could be disabled. In short, yes, they can be disabled. The way we designate people as
disabled involves the interaction between both the medical and social models of disability.
From the medical model, we see a deficit in ability on part of the individual that hinders
everyday living as a disability. Also, Julian Savulescu claims that “certain biological or
psychological states can be capabilities or disabilities depending on the social or natural
environment” (2006, 333). An actual transhuman is likely to be subject to disability just as
any being with ability can be susceptible to disability. While the transhumans currently do
not exist, we can at least look at how this could happen based on the suggestions and
models proposed by transhumanists for developing transhuman technology. Let’s look at
the case of conscious uploading as an example. Consciousness needs a place to reside, likely
in some mechanical or hybrid biomechanical structure. This structure may or may not
mobile. If it is, this person (consciousness and mechanical structure) will have certain
abilities. These could be strength, speed, ability to withstand extreme weather related
events, but maybe not lightning. Lightning would certainly injure and disable this person.
Most accounts I have read about transhumanism do not involve an option to return to the
form of a human as we know them. Once you are transhuman, you cannot go back. You are
now faced with a different set of needs than whatever was required by your previous
embodiment. Anything that goes wrong with the transhuman form can be disabling
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because you will not necessarily have the means to regain abilities that have been hindered
that are critical for functioning.
Transhumanists have the privilege of foresight to determine that they will need
certain things and likely have the ability to prepare for living in such a form. So, while
transhumanists may start with certain privileges that come with enhancement, they will
still be subject to some forms of oppression that come with being perceived as abnormal.
And, in fact, if they fail to foresee all possible future scenarios, there is a likeliness that the
transhuman individual will become disabled or no longer exist altogether as the social and
physical environment may lack appropriate features to afford their survival. A particular
caveat to this is the idea that through radical enhancement, the transhumanist, upon
transforming into this posthuman form, will develop or acquire some extremely enhanced
sense of knowledge or wisdom that would equate to the psychic foresight necessary in
order to eliminate this problem. I would concede to that, but also keep in mind that no one
has any way of predicting future events to concretely claim that would or would not
happen.
The fact of transhumanism right now is that most of its goals are currently beyond
our ability to achieve them. The only people with whom we can interact are not themselves
enhanced. Despite their lack of radical enhancement, we call them transhumanists because
they live the philosophy of transhumanism. In general, we relegate transhumanists to the
fringes of the scientific world, saying that their ideas cannot possibly be real, that they are
trying to be gods among humans, that they are seeking something completely unnatural
and inhuman. What is often thought to be so wrong with transhumanism is not so much
that superhumans could take over the world. Rather, it is the fear that humanity will no
longer be necessary or we will be of a lesser moral personhood status.
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Conclusion
In summary, I would like to say that this paper addresses several key points that are
overlooked by disability theorists and enhancement supporters. Rather than being in total
opposition, disabled and enhanced individuals share the common feature of being viewed
as abnormal. Enhancement technologies should continue to be developed with caution and
good oversight. More to the point of this paper, I have tried to demonstrate the abnormality
of both the disabled and the enhanced abled through the medicalisation and normalisation
processes described by Michel Foucault, the normalising trends described by Mary Beth
Mader, and the social interaction that leads to discrimination and oppression by
Rosemarie-Garland Thomson and Iris Marion Young. While enhanced individuals may not
face oppression to the degree that disabled persons do, they may face some significant
hardships because of their enhancements. The status of being abnormal in the social
context is precarious regardless of how it is manifested. The oppressive measures faced by
abnormal individuals may be different, ranging from a lack of respect, to objectification,
fetishization, commodification, and exploitation, to violence and eradication. By including
enhancements in the topic of ability and disability, each part plays an informative role in
how we perceive and analyse the others.
The larger issue is how might we continue to work on the issues of social oppression
in the face of developing technologies that can enrich and enhance our lives. We might do
this by teaching values of acceptance of abnormal individuals rather than mere tolerance.
Acceptance ranges from tolerance to beneficial cooperation. Mere tolerance is not enough
to combat normalising oppression. However, it need not be the case that every person
engages in a beneficial cooperation through friendships and close relationships either. Our
cultural norms can be allowed to shift. The issue here is that there is still an intrinsic
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hierarchy despite the broader categories of normal and abnormal. We still view abilities in
the context of being able, not being able, or being incredibly able. The mode of
enhancement that extends our already present abilities reinforces this categorisation.
Transhumanist-type enhancement, on the other hand, reconceptualises the ability
spectrum in a way that removes some abilities and grants others by seeking to change the
embodiment of capability in such a way that it is distinctly something other than human
whilst still resembling something descendent of human. The transhumanist ability
becomes an extra-ability, or one that creates another axis of ability that disrupts the linear
scale of our current understanding of abilities. We place a high value on those who can
produce more as we have commodified individual ability. Perhaps if we viewed life as more
of an overall experience rather than how much we can achieve or produce, we may shift
towards a less stringent hierarchy of ability.
One hope of enhancement supporters is that by increasing not only the incidence of
encountering abnormal individuals, but also the variance of how abnormal individuals
appear, abnormal appearances are more readily accepted in the social environment. A
higher incidence of variance weakens what could be considered average or normal. It
forces our expectations to change. If we continue to view disability as a deficit and
enhancement as a benefit, then of course we will we look at this as if the norm is being
moved farther and out of reach from those below the norm. However, if we view both as
abnormal, where we aren’t viewing disability as a deficit and enhancement as a benefit, an
increase in the visibility of one may benefit the other. As enhancers have the choice to
enhance and to wear their enhancements visibly, they are in the better position to do this.
Given that they have the choice, enhancers also have a certain privilege of being able to
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return to normality if they so desire. Disabled individuals do not get this option - they must
depend on society to change the view of what is normal.
An objection to enhancement on the grounds that enhanced abilities are abnormal is
that non-therapeutic (and many therapeutic) enhancements are a choice. Recalling the idea
of morphological freedom, we must ask whether we are willingly entering into an
oppressive state by making this choice. If we are aware of the risks, then this may be true.
But in other cases of wilfully changing appearance to something socially considered
abnormal, are the abnormal individuals asking for it? In everyday situations, people dye
their hair unnatural colours knowing that they could potentially be a target of harassment
and marginalisation. This does not have to happen, though. Making the claim that someone
ought to forfeit their enhanced ability or not to enhance their ability at all violates their
sense of autonomy. Many enhancements are temporary or reversible. One can certainly
give up an enhancement to avoid oppression related to that particular ability. Exploitation
entails a certain loss of autonomy. Giving up that ability to escape exploitation amounts to
self-sabotage, even if it is an autonomous act. In exploitation, the person being exploited
can take actions self-sabotage and no longer be useful to the person doing the exploiting.
When the person no longer has that ability, she is now useless to the exploiter. Those who
are exploited, if they ruin their reason for being exploited, may be subjected to punishment,
violence, being thrown out, killed, or taken to be exploited in another way. Exploitation
operates outside of fairness. A person who is exploited, who can no longer produce, is likely
to suffer severe consequences. Giving up the enhancement while being oppressed violates a
certain sense of autonomy.
We may also be tempted to say that the person should have been aware of the
potential for exploitation or violence. The foresight necessary to predict exploitation as it is
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occurring in real time is not exactly a proper objection. For this, I invoke the idea of psychic
foresight, a sort of foresight that entails an attitude of “you should have known better”
when obviously no one can predict what might happen to them in the future. It is one thing
to be aware of the risk of exploitation. It is quite another to see it before it happens to you.
We are in an awkward place where we are trying to navigate a social terrain in which no
one wants to be forced to change. Unfortunately, if one does not change, one may be left
behind especially if the surrounding social environment is unresponsive to the needs of the
individual. We do not operate in this world alone. Social responsibility must be taken up as
well as individual responsibility. Yes, we may make alternative means for accessibility for a
variety of types of ability, but the responsibility of increasing function and ability is on the
shoulders of both the individual and society. We have a tendency to demand the individual
be normal, for the disabled to rise up so we do not have to wait for them and for those who
outperform to slow down so the rest of society can keep up. But we could change what the
norm is to be more inclusive of the varieties.
A significant objection from disability theorists is that more enhancement will raise
the overall norm of ability. It is thought that enhancement will further exacerbate issues
associated with disabled individuals. Disabled individuals are frequently viewed as
incapable of working, incapable of making life choices, stupid, slow, unproductive, lazy,
attention seeking, leaching, and unworthy of living. Many are blamed for their disabilities,
especially when no accommodations are enacted. They are subjected to oppressive
measures such as discrimination, harassment, marginalisation, violence, and
powerlessness. In many cases, people with disabilities are subjected to eugenics protocols
ranging from forced sterilisation to blatant extermination. The gaps associated with
comparative differences in ability rest in how much we value that ability. If our value of a
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particular ability is that it is expected, then yes, gaps will be created and exacerbated by
increasing the number of people who have increased abilities. Raising the norm to an ever
higher standard is likely unavoidable if we pursue enhancing only abilities that enjoy a high
status in our society. If we focus our enhancement developments towards increasing
variance of abilities, we will be forced to look at our environments in other creative ways.
Increasing the variance of ability of people in the world weakens the power of what can be
conceived of as normal. It forces our hand to create spaces that function for broader
varieties of people. Taking an approach from non-therapeutic additive enhancements, we
look at those who have the flexibility to not need suffer immediate consequences if their
environment is lacking in affordances for them. They are still capable, but at the same time,
it affords the opportunities for development without the tension of critical need even
though those who need the change the most will ultimately benefit. We ought to be reevaluating our relationship to social norms while we are taking progressive steps in
developing technology that can benefit all people. When we develop enhancement
technologies, we should be looking at the broader impact they will have for the whole of
society. Perhaps we ought to be looking at enhancements for our environment as well as
for individuals.
The transhumanist wants to shift the norm of being human to something that is
posthuman, but still a person. This calls for a radical restructuring of how we see ourselves
in relation to each other. One of the goals is to eradicate the incidence of disability. While
such a goal is admirable in a sense, disability will always exist so long as ability exists if we
continue to view ability as a dichotomy. Transhumanism may change the content of
abilities for transhumans, but they will still be subject to disability themselves as all things
are subject to imperfection and abnormality. So far, enhancement proponents (not
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necessarily transhumanists), have been focusing on how to enhance the individual body.
They could look beyond enhancing the individual and look more into how enhancements
can be made to our social environments. Enhancements can be made to make our
environments work for us rather than against us such as creating work spaces that
encourage creativity and human connection, rather than isolated workspaces in a hive-like
office space. Other enhancements in the social environment could include means of
accessing knowledge that one ordinarily would not have but would not need any special
device to obtain, such as the lighted traffic signs being implemented on roadways. The idea
of providing accessible information could be spread to include digital signs with audible
announcements at bus stops and metros. Some of these things already exist in the world,
but ought to be extended to other areas where people frequently need information such as
stores, parks, recreational facilities, and so forth. Innovation for these sorts of
enhancements are boundless. This has the potential to change the content of our norm of
individual ability into a collective ability where individuals relate to the structural
environment more effectively regardless of their medical degree of ability. Norms shift and
change over time. While technological progress is speeding up in a lot of ways, it is also
showing signs of slowing. We have had a significant increase in innovation but we have not
yet figured out all the permutations of applying those innovations. Creating newer and
newer technology is not necessarily what shifts the norm. The shift occurs as the new
technology spreads through the social fabric and becomes integrated into daily life. This is
where we must pay close attention to how technology is dispersed throughout society. Is it
sold? Is it designed for individual use? Is it designed for many people to use in a public
space? The content of the norm is subject to change. Many of the newer technologies are
being made with increased accessibility in mind. Making enhancements to raise disability
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to a normal expected ability serves to reinforce the norm. Making enhancement available to
those who have normal abilities serves to shift the norm. The way we look at
enhancements of both therapeutic and nontherapeutic varieties right now is how they are
applied to individuals. This creates an aggregate of enhanced individuals, some who are
normalised, some who are expanding abnormal ability, and some who are both. We should
also be considering how enhancements can be used in broader terms, such as enhancing an
environment to meet the needs of the individuals engaged in that environment. We could
look more into enhancements that can be applied to the social environment, where they
could increase accessibility and functionality for a more varied group of individuals. As a
biological species, we are constantly trying to find new ways to survive. As a social species,
we will likely always have hierarchies. So long as we value sameness, a norm will always
hold power. Enhancement can shift a norm, but it can also cause more abnormality if the
enhancement is not extending already present abilities. As a social species, we are
responsive to the needs of others. We do not develop a technology and purposefully keep it
out of reach. It takes time, but if accommodations for accessibility are needed, they will be
brought about. It would be wrong to categorically reject enhancement out of fear when so
much benefit can be gained and so much change can be initiated in how we can come to
accept naturally occurring variances and abnormalities brought about by any means.
Looking through the lens of abnormality, we can take this instead as a further call in
social change and development to embrace and accept that which is abnormal rather than
constantly trying to fix or standardise it. It is possible that we could see a different effect in
which a wider range of abilities are accommodated for in the social environment. It is likely
that what is considered a normal ability will change given newer technologies. For
example, we consider driving a car to be normal in our society. Of course everyone is not
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able to drive. Many people do not have the financial resources, but others are not physically
able of operating a motor vehicle. We have changed the norm of self-transport and mobility
to be much faster and more efficient by using technological means. In doing so, we changed
the world around us and now clear flat pathways are available for all means of transport.
Did this impact the lives of disabled individuals in a particularly harmful way? That is
difficult to say. Many disabled individuals make use of roads and vehicles just as people
without disabilities do. Enhancement could change that, changing personal transport to
one that is not based on the ground. Roads would become obsolete. But then it would the
responsibility of an entire society to maintain the tools for all to flourish. As we develop
technologies to enhance our lives, we change those technologies as we see fit so that they
may be accessible to as many people as we wish. In this case of transportation, self-driving
cars can be assistive to people who would not, under current conditions, ordinarily be able
to drive. In enhancing the abilities of people, we have made it the norm to be immune from
a number of devastating illnesses. By reducing the incidence of polio, did people who are
paralysed experience more or less discrimination and oppression in their lives? That is an
impossible question to answer. Abnormal people will always be striving for acceptance.
What is at hand is how we continue to enforce the idea that we should be normal.
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clearly identified and acknowledged within the text or content of the submission. In the
event of a subsequent dispute over the copyrights to material contained in this submission,
the Author agrees to indemnify and hold harmless UNF and its employees or agents for any
uses of the material authorized by this license. If this submission is based upon work that
has been sponsored or supported by any agency or organization other than UNF, the
Author represents that he/she has fulfilled any right of review or other obligation required
by contract or agreement with the supporting entity. Author specifically acknowledges that
this submission may constitute an educational record under the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974, as amended from time to time, and any corresponding state laws,
rules or regulations. Author expressly consents to the use and disclosure of this submission
as contemplated under this Agreement. UNF will make the submission available to the
public using a Creative Commons Attribution / Noncommercial / No derivative works
license accompanied by a copyright statement indicating the Author’s continuing rights.
UNF will take all reasonable steps to ensure that the Author’s name remains clearly
associated with the submission and that no alterations of the content are made. This
agreement (i) contains the full and complete understanding between the parties hereto
with respect to the subject matter hereof, (ii) supersedes all prior agreements and
understandings whether written or oral pertaining thereto and (iii) cannot be modified or
amended except by a written instrument signed by each party hereto. The University of
North Florida is a constituent member of the Florida state university system existing
pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution of the State of Florida and is
administered by The University of North Florida Board of Trustees, a public body
corporate, pursuant to said Section and Section 1001.72, Florida Statutes. Nothing
contained in this Agreement shall be construed or interpreted as (1) denying to either
party any remedy or defense available to such party under the laws of the State of Florida;
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(2) the consent of the State of Florida or its agencies and public bodies corporate to be
sued; or (3) a waiver of sovereign immunity of the State of Florida beyond the waiver
provided in Section 768.28, Florida Statutes. This Agreement shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida applicable to contracts
entered into and to be fully performed therein, excluding the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (as it may be adopted and amended from time to time),
without reference to conflict of laws principles. In the event any suit, action or proceeding
is brought by either party with respect to this Agreement, such action, suit or proceeding
shall be brought in a Florida state court located in Duval County, Florida or in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, as the party
bringing the suit, action or proceeding may elect and both parties hereby accept and
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of such courts for the purpose of any such action, suit
or proceeding. In addition, both parties hereby irrevocably waive, to the fullest extent
permitted by law, any objection that they may now or hereafter have to the laying of venue
of any suit, action or proceeding arising out of this Agreement or any judgment entered by
any court in respect of any part thereof brought in the State of Florida and hereby
irrevocably waive any claim that any suit, action or proceedings brought in Duval County,
Florida, has been brought in an inconvenient forum. Neither party shall assign any of their
rights or obligations hereunder without the prior written consent of the other, and any
purported assignment without such prior written consent shall be null and void and of no
force or effect. Any provisions of this Agreement found by a court of competent jurisdiction
to be void or unenforceable shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other
provisions hereof. All of each party’s remedies hereunder at law, in equity or otherwise
shall be cumulative and the exercise of any one or more remedies shall not in any way
whatsoever waive any of such party’s other rights or remedies under this Agreement at
law, in equity or otherwise. In the event a party to this Agreement institutes litigation to
enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees
and disbursements and court costs incurred in connection with such litigation, whether
incurred in preparation for or at trial, on appeal or otherwise. AUTHOR HEREBY CERTIFIES
THAT HE/SHE IS EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER. Please select one of the
following thesis/dissertation availability options
___ No restriction on availability
___ 1-year embargo I agree to the terms of this Thesis/Dissertation Availability Agreement:
AUTHOR: Signature:____________________________________________________
Print Name:___________________________________________________
Date:________________________________________________________
Accepted for and on behalf of the University of North Florida Board of Trustees: By:
____________________________________________ Len Roberson, Ph.D.; CI, CT, SC:L Dean, The Graduate
School
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